The Discourse Analysis of the Concepts of Political Identity and Citizenship In Reformist and Fundamentalist Discourses (in 1370s-1380s SH)

Gholam-Reza Behrouzi-lak1; Mahmoud Fallah2

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Abstract
Investigating the effect of globalization on political spheres is among the most important concerns for the scholars in that discipline. One of the most important subjects pertaining to globalization is the reaction of the political discourse to this unique phenomenon in human life. The issue dealt with in this study is focused on comparing the reaction of the reformist and fundamentalist political discourses (in 1370s-1380s in Iran) to the evolutions in the political identity and citizenship under the influence of globalization. The reason for choosing that period is the spread of objective manifestations of globalization with a dominance of western and liberal versions in that period. To do so, we have attempted to use the logic of equivalence and difference in discourse analysis of Laclau and Mouffe to analyze such a reaction. The most important achievement of the present study is that the reformist discourse – with Sayyid Muhammad Khatami, Iranian president of that time, as its representative – had more consonance and conformity with the spread of globalization. As a result, attracting the signifiers and the signs of globalization of the liberal discourse into the reformist discourse has accelerated in that discourse. On the contrary, the fundamentalist discourse – with Allamah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah as its intellectual representative – treated the globalized western discourse with a resisting identity approach to the logic of difference and distinction, defining and reconstructing its own signifiers and signs through a confrontation with globalization.

Keywords
globalization, political identity, citizenship, Islamic Republic of Iran, logic of equivalence, logic of difference.

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Introduction

Identity is one of the important issues in today's world. Spread of the identity crisis all over the world and the challenges of globalization in this regard are among the major concerns of the political theoreticians. The discourse of political Islam in the Islamic Republic of Iran has been subject to the challenges and opportunities of globalization. One of the challenges of the political Islam in the globalization era is the issue of political identity.

In this article, we will attempt to synoptically explain the meaning of identity and political identity to investigate how globalization is reflected in the political identity from the perspective of political discourses in the IRI. The discourses of political Islam have faced vicissitudes during the last four decades. Here, we will mainly focus on those discourses of political Islam that fall under the category of political sub-discourses inside the IRI and are considered a part of the structure of political power. In short, we may consider the fundamentalist and reformist discourses as the two prominent discourses of political Islam in IRI in the past two decades. To investigate the effect of globalization on the discourses of the political Islam, we will mainly attempt to study the intellectual and theoretical reactions of the most important theoreticians of these two discourses. Considering the use of discourse concepts and literature in our analysis, the analysis method in this study will be discourse analysis based on Laclau and Mouffe's model. To do so, we will explain the nature of discourse analysis of globalization.

Concepts

1. Political identity

Identity is of various types. Some have spoken of individual identity as opposed to social identity. Sometimes, we find discussions on cultural identity. Finally, the political identity has also been considered. We
may consider the theory of identity classification as focused on the discussion of 1970s (Dowran and Mohseni, 1382 SH, p. 112). Although there are various views and widespread discussions regarding the formation of the individual, cultural, social and political identities, the more important issue here is the precise definition of the political identity and what we mean. The political identity has been variously defined. In Barbara Henry's view, political identity is among the various types of group identity. The group identity is, on the one hand, suggestive of capacity for contemplation and negotiation – which individuals are linked to – and, on the other hand, it includes options and preferences stated by these individual as group members. She defines, finally, the political identity as follows (Henry, 2001):

A) The generality of relations between citizens and the institutions, the behavior and method of participation in political process, the criteria of appropriating resources, costs and exerting them;

B) The rational and irrational values and symbols based on which a collective tradition and a hidden consensus have been formed as well as the justifications for appropriation of risks, costs and benefits;

C) A flexible composite of the first two categories (A and B)

In another definition, political identity suggests two distinctive dimensions. In Maureen Whitebrook's view, political identity is used in two semantic spectra: from citizenship in a relatively neutral and merely descriptive sense, which is essential in the individual-state relationship, to features of the group members or in a sense beyond the individuals' political identity shows the identity of political organizations. Groups that are important in the political arena are organizations defined politically such as nations or states, or are groups inside the states or are transnational groups (Whitebrook, 2001, p. 7).

Whitebrook maintains that there are two methods for theorizing on political identity. The first type is suggestive of the individual identity in the political context; and the other is the identity of the political
subject that is taken as the unit of political analysis, i.e. a citizen, a member of a group or nation. The individual is identified due to his/her belonging to – with having the features of – a political organization or an organization with political dimension, and is attributed to an identity (Whitebrook, 2001, p. 9).

2. Political identity and citizenship

Considering the two meanings of political identity – as the demarcation with others and the individual's status inside the society – the political identity will be investigated from the second point of view in the present study. The political identity goes back to the individuals' status inside the political system, which is linked to citizenship from this perspective. In Castles and Davidson's view, the main root of the citizenship is "in the action performed by the individual for strengthening himself against the environment wherein he was born" (Castles and Davidson, 2005, p. 94).

Citizenship has been investigated from various points of view. Some of its dimensions may be investigated in the political philosophy, social and moral philosophy, social theory and discourse perspectives (Nijati, 1383 SH, p. 45). Brian Turner is among the most prominent sociologists focusing on discussions pertaining to citizenship. While investigating various theories of citizenship, he has put forward his far-reaching social theory of citizenship based on four categories: content of social rights and obligations, form and type of citizenship, social forces carrying citizenship functions, and social arrangements for distributing citizenship interests.

Keith Faulks has also attempted to investigate the theories of citizenship based on the four main components. The result of his discussion is introduction of four main indices in investigating the citizenship: context, scope, content, and depth (Faulks, 2000, p. 17). Faulks
has put forward the following morphology regarding the superficial and deep citizenship in table 2-1.

Table 2-1: Faulks' model of superficial and deep citizenship (Faulks, 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Superficial citizenship</th>
<th>Deep citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Rights are considered as superior;                                                   • Rights and responsibilities mutually support one another;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Passive;                                                                             • Active;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The state as a necessary evil;                                                       • Political society (not necessarily the state) as the foundation of a good life;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Merely a public situation;                                                           • spread in the public and private life;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Independent;                                                                         • Mutual dependence;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Freedom through choosing;                                                            • Freedom through civil virtues;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• legal                                                                                 • Moral</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of the models presented for citizenship typology has certain features. These models have often been presented in the context of modern citizenship. Each of the axes of this model is focused on a certain dimension of citizenship. Of course, we must note that in each of those indices, we may find simple or compound types (See table 2-2).

1. Context of citizenship: this index means, as it is found in Faulks's model as well, the atmosphere of the formation of citizenship idea. Here, we may identify different contexts for formation of citizenship, for instance: the context of traditional slavery or feudal society, religious context, bourgeois/capitalist context.

2. Foundation of citizenship: this is focused on the attitude towards citizenship and the related rights and commitments. Considering the existence of various theories regarding legitimacy, we may obtain various types for citizenship. Of course, in some of these theories, citizenship has been completely weakened and diluted. But if we
consider citizenship in its general sense, we may find a proportionality between these theories and the model of citizenship. Examples of the foundations of citizenship are as follows: citizenship based on the traditional attitude towards legitimacy, citizenship based on religious doctrines, and citizenship based on social contract. Discussion on the top/down citizenship and elite/democratic citizenship returns to the foundation of citizenship.

3. Content of citizenship: inquiry on the content of citizenship returns to the relationship between commitments/privileges or rights/obligations. Various types of citizenship have offered various views on these limits and duties. Here, we may compare between citizenship in the models of pre-modern, liberal, post-liberal and so on.

4. The depth of citizenship: the depth of citizenship is related to the limits of importance and interference of citizenship in private and public spheres. The modern system has considered citizenship as mainly related to the public sphere and maintains that the private/individual sphere is at the disposal of the persons.

5. Type of citizenship: each of the theories of citizenship offers a different attitude towards the citizens' participation in the political arena. Prominent examples of types of citizenship can be found in the passive, active and dutiful models.

6. The scope of citizenship: discussion on the scope of citizenship returns to how closed or open the enjoyment of citizenship rights is in a society. Besides, we may discuss the issue of single or plural citizenship.

7. The end of citizenship: in various theories of citizenship, there is a variety of views on the end of citizenship. The end of citizenship is itself dependent on the end of the political system of the society. In a synopsis, we may consider the ends stated for the citizenship as follows: fulfilling the needs in traditional societies, preparing the ground for virtues, freedom, negating dominance.
Table 2-2: The conceptual framework of 'political identity based on citizenship'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indices of citizenship</th>
<th>Definitions and instances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Religious; traditional: agriculture/ feudal; bourgeoisie/capitalist; sphere of power struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td>Traditional legitimacy; divine; charismatic; social contract; situation and context of the society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content</td>
<td>The extent of the relationship between commitments and rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depth</td>
<td>Extension of citizenship idea into private/ public sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Passive, active, dutiful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>Exclusive/ open; tribal; state-city; nation-state; global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End</td>
<td>Moral virtue; religious/ hereafter virtue; freedom; welfare; negating class dominance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Analysis model**

The discourses always react to the existing challenges in two basic ways: logic of equivalence and logic of difference. Such logic shows also the mechanism for formation of the group and collective identity of a discourse. The logic of equivalence cause convergence, and the logic of difference intensifies the process of otherness and causes plurality of identities. In Laclau and Mouffe's words, "we see that the logic of equivalence is the logic of simplification of the political arena, while the logic of difference is the logic of its growing expansion and complication" (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 130). Considering the logics of equivalence and difference, as well as over-determination of the subjects, we may explain how various discourses confront different challenges. Here, we may identify two ways of confrontation:

A) The logic of assimilation and absorption of common concepts and ideas: one of the models of formation and promotion of discourses
is formed on the basis of the logic of assimilation. Considering the feature of floatation of discourses and the logic of the probability underlying them, the discourses revise themselves from the viewpoints of simultaneity, equivalence and difference. Existence of common interests and equal mentalities can practically facilitate such a process. In that case, the sphere of discourse becomes important. In case of spread of assimilation, discourses can borrow concepts – in the common sphere of discourse – from one another and reuse them in their articulation.

Sometimes, the assimilation is performed based on the role of power and hegemony. An instance of this can be seen in the views presented by Gramsci. By adding the concept of hegemony, Gramsci added a new dimension to the effects of the ruling class on the other classes by producing consensus and empathy. For Gramsci, "all sub-structures of daily life are the place for deployment of power" (Khaleqi, 1382 SH, p. 237). Thus, the networks of power infiltrate into the depth of the souls of the subject and dominate him/her. The discourse hegemony causes assimilation to be performed and the discourses under the dominance go away or be marginalized or, in the least impressibility of components from the dominant discourses, be assimilated to the discourse under the dominance. The relationship between the discourse of the western modernism and other discourses in the past two decades can be explained by this logic.

The dominance of the discourse of western modernity has led to impressibility, weakness and – sometimes – decline of other discourses in the present era. Some part of the effects of globalization can be explained, due to the simultaneity with the dominance of western liberal democracy, on the basis on this very logic of assimilation and absorption of other discourses or their resistance against the western liberal democracy discourse. The discourse of liberal democracy has used its dominance to influence other discourses.
B) The logic of difference and resistance against discourse challenges. The second type of the reactions of discourses against the discourse challenges can be explained in terms of the logic of difference and distinction. Discourses always try to form themselves before rival discourses on the basis of the logic of hostility and otherness. In this way, the ground is prepared for resistance against rival discourses for them. If a discourse cannot assimilate, in facing a challenge, or absorb to it or employ some concepts from it in its articulation, it will try to resist against it. In such cases, the extent of resistance would be directly under the influence of the extent of the pressure from the dominant discourses, and one can delineate a direct correlation between them.

The political identity and citizenship from the viewpoints of the discourses of political Islam in Iran

To investigate the discourses of political Islam in Iran regarding the issues pertaining to citizenship, we will act according to the seven axes of citizenship model: context, foundation, content, depth, type, scope and end of citizenship. To prepare the ground for comparing these views, we will investigate those views comparatively with an emphasis on each axis.

1. Context of citizenship

The context of citizenship in the Islamist discourse in Iran is often a concentration on religious culture and identity. However, such a context is sometimes mixed with two other components, i.e. the national-Iranian identity and the modern identity, and it would cause a difference in the views on the discourses of political Islam in Iran. Besides, due to the reality of national borders, the citizenship model – in spite of its theoretical extension to Islamic nation – is practically mentioned for national borders. To do so, the constitutional law is

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often adduced to and, in practice, it is limited to the framework of the national borders. In cases where there is a theoretical consideration of the widespread and transnational nature of the Islamic identity, it remains in the context of the national state due to the needs and necessities of the Umm al-Qura (i.e. metropolis).

As to the religious context, citizenship – in addition to reference to Islamic origins – is accompanied by Imam Khomeini’s views. The experience of Islamic state in IRI as well as formation of some ideas in the structure of Islamic republic in the form of a nation-state has been effective in this regard. From this perspective, a common aspect can be found in the context of the citizenship model between the reformist and fundamentalist discourses. Their distinctive feature, however, returns to their relation with new world. This causes the modern citizenship concepts to be propounded in proportion to accepting new models. In this way, the citizenship context must be investigated on the basis of two categories: the relationship of religious identity/ national identity and the relationship of Islamic/ modern identity.

From Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi’s viewpoint, Islamic identity is prior to national identity. Thus, the religious taint of the citizenship context dominates. The external manifestation of the religious identity is the celestial culture and eastern mysticism. The westerners "in the other side of the planet delineate our identity with mystical discussions and divine knowledge". The eastern Muslim "finds his identity with indices such as spirituality, humanity, morality, emotion, and its metaphysical philosophy, government, and ideology" (Mesbah Yazdi, 1380 SH, p. 5). The priority of religious identity in his statements has manifested itself even in the order of the loss of identity: "apart from the religious identity, the national identity has also been scorned and lost" (Mesbah Yazdi, 1380 SH, p. 5).

In the speeches of Ayatollah Khatami, the religious context of
citizenship identity has also been considered. In his view, "our identity is intermingled with Islam, and our common civilization and culture does, in the first place, owe to the piety that is originated from the source of revelation, settles in the souls, grows in the thoughts of the intellectuals and crystallizes in the society" (Khatami, 1379 SH, p. 103). As a result, "we started a new experience in our revolution thereby to reconcile piety with rationality: One can be pious and be liberal; one can be pious and respect the human rights and the man's right to govern his own fate; one can be pious and have a prosperous and advanced world" (Khatami, 1379 SH, p. 46).

This, however, hinders paying attention to the Iranian dimensions of Islamic identity in Khatami's view. He writes, "of course, this moderate Iranian esprit has been fertilized with Islam; Islam has made it prosper. The link between Islam and the Iranian esprit has brought about great blessings both for Iranians and for Islam; and today, we honor to be Muslims and Iranians" (Khatami, 1379 SH, p. 80). He regards the Islamism as something inseparable from the Iranian identity: "Anyway, religion has always had an important status in Iranian culture. Especially after the advent of Islam as well as the Islamic values and teachings, our culture has become increasingly religious. That is, the basis of our culture is religious. This is our culture."

(Khatami, 1386 A, p. 239).

However, the main distinction between the views of the personages under study regarding the context of citizenship must be investigated in their look at the modern grounds for identity and citizenship. In Ayatollah Mesbah's view, the Islamic identity is in drastic contrast to the western modern identity. "Humanism, secularism and liberalism are the main components of the atheist culture, and they are opposed to God-centrism, principality of religion and jurist's authority, and legal limitation of the man's activity in the circle of obeying One God are the main components of the Islamic thought" (Mesbah Yazdi, 1378 SH, vol1, p. 175).
Khatami, however, claims to be ready to use the concepts of the western modern world. He writes, "Now that we have revolted and want to have an Islamic regime accordingly, we can consider the revolution as the source for a new civilization only if we have the ability and qualification for taking the positive aspects of the western civilization and have the consciousness to discern its undesired aspects to avoid them. If we are to take the positive aspects of the present civilization and avoid the negative aspects, we have to rightly recognize the west and judge it fairly. We must choose its strong points and avoid its weaknesses by referring to the intellectual sources and value foundations of our Islamic revolution" (Khatami, 1376 SH, p. 192).

Even in his central idea and motto, he welcomes the western ideas: "the civil society that we want to establish inside our country and we advise other countries to take it as well has an essential difference with the civil society originated from the Greek philosophical thoughts and Rome's political experiences. Indeed, it is the civil society that has found its special identity and orientation in the modern world by passing through the middle ages. However, there must not necessarily be a difference and contrast between these two in all their results and signs. Thus, we must never ignore non-imitative taking of the positive achievements of the western civil society" (Khatami, 1379 SH, p. 13). Ayatollah Mesbah, however, maintains that the main root of the civil society, in his view, is in the Islamic tradition; so he feels no owe to the west (See Mesbah, 1378 SH, vol.2, p. 52).

2. Foundation of Citizenship

The foundation of citizenship, unlike the context of citizenship, is different in content in the reformist and fundamentalist discourses. As we see in the views offered by the thinkers of those discourses regarding the political legitimacy, they look at the foundation of citizenship from two different angles. While Khatami looks at the
political life from the perspective of public legitimacy, Ayatollah Mesbah, from a quite different perspective, maintains that the foundation of legitimacy of the political life is attribution to God, which is manifested even in appointment of the executives of law. Thus, in view of the previous discussions, we may accept such an opposition in foundations of citizenship in the two abovementioned views.

3. Content of citizenship

Considering the foundations of citizenship in the two abovementioned attitudes, the content of citizenship also varies in them. These variations can be found in the spheres of political freedoms, participation in political arena and other issues. Political freedom has been one of the main mottoes of the reformist discourse in that era. In the opposite side, the fundamentalists severely criticized the way the reformists propounded the freedom as a subject matter. Thus, one of the axial issues determining the content of citizenship in that era was freedom.

Sayyid Muhammad Khatami maintains that freedom is one of the important achievements of the Islamic revolution that has intermingled it with piety. He maintains that the manifestation of the Islamic republic is in the democracy as well as the Islamic and spiritual values. Thus, firstly, it is necessary to offer our definition of freedom as an essential component of democratic systems, because freedom in thoughts and minds is vacillating in a spectrum from absolute negation of freedom as an anti-value to absolute unbridled freedom (See Khatami, 1386A., pp. 215-219).

In tracking the roots of civil society in the Prophet's City (Medina), he has referred to the point that, "the civil society we are seeking has its roots, historically and theoretically, in the Prophet's City. Turning Yathrib into the Prophet's City was not merely turning a name into another name… With the Prophet's City and Allah's day, the spiritual
history and geography is created in the world, and this is the starting point for the spread of a type of culture, insight and character that has once emerged in the Islamic civilization” (Khatami, 1379 SH, p. 13). The Prophet opened in Medina a new and promising horizon to the men. "But the Muslims' historical fate was such that half a century after the advent of Islam, the dark clouds of despotism darkened the sky of their social life; and in that dark situation, the insight of the Muslim thinkers was closed to the true nature of power and politics” (Khatami, 1378 SH, p. 423). Nevertheless, despite the dominance of despotism in the Islamic world, freedom became the central idea in the new western world and "the affairs such as freedom, controlling and supervising power, and contingency of the government upon people's will as well as effort to find a human, practical and calculable mechanism for realizing it were obtained at a high cost. And these are among the most important achievements of today's civilization, if not the most important one” (Khatami, 1373 SH, p. 285). For Khatami, however, the important point is that we can find the roots of such principles and the basis of such beliefs in the religious and moral teachings of the old societies, including the east and, especially, in Islam (See Khatami, 1378 SH, pp. 9-17). In that case, "we must fairly judge that the clearer, more serious and more practical innovative plan had been in the context of the new civilization and had been offered by the western thinkers and intellectuals” (Khatami, 1373 SH, p. 285).

In Khatami's view, although freedom is the achievement of the west, it is accompanied by some deficiencies: the western view of the man and freedom is a narrow, wrong and one-dimensional view; and accordingly, the mankind has paid a heavy cost and is still paying out (Khatami, 1373 SH, p. 191). Another feature of freedom in the west is its being one-dimensional. "Although the man has had valuable achievements in the sphere of legitimate freedoms, the one-dimensional freedom, as originated from the monoplane soul of the modern western man, is
itself the origin of the heavy hardships in human life" (Khatami, 1383 SH, p. 289). Such a freedom has victimized the social justice as well. It is true that the western freedom is involved in its specific issues and problems. But in Khatami's view, in the Islamic world, "in this side of the world, there has not been yet a right philosophical and theological contemplation on the concepts such as power and its constitutionality as well as the human methods for controlling and limiting the political power, civil society, basic rights, freedom, citizenship right, etc. If there has been promising and basic discussions, they have been, without relying on traditions, based on the most superficial western data or have been faded in the tumult of political disputes often powerful and naturally superficial and vulgar" (Khatami, 1378 SH, p. 436).

In this way, in Khatami’s discourse, freedom is an axial matter and we must attempt to exert it in its acceptable sense in the political-social arena. This freedom must be consistent with the features of the Islamic society. Thus, Khatami attempts to adduce Islamic doctrines to state the limits of freedom and offer the distinction between the Islamic view and the western view regarding freedom. In his view, the pioneers of the western view claim that their thought is a freedom-centered one and regard their social system as founded upon it. This freedom, however, is one of the natural ideals of the man. Thus, the western system calls man to eat freely, wear freely, speak and think freely, and live freely, and considers his goal in life to be material welfare and enjoying more facilities, while considering this way of life as reaching one of the greatest and the most sacred human ideals, i.e. freedom. In this way, it makes use of the most primary natural desires of the man – which are much strong – for the cause of its system. It even deceives most of the men as to the truth of freedom and true freedom – from which the western regimes are much distanced despite their claims" (Khatami, 1376 SH, p. 137).

By delineating such an image of the west, Khatami seeks to identify
the limits and restrictions for freedom. One of these restrictions is the Islamic regulations. He states that, "The foundation of the strategic politics of Islam is producing immunity. That is, he considers the foundations of his work to be producing intellectual, emotional, doctrinal and mental immunity in its adherents, and educates them in a way that they can resist the invasion from inside; and if the foundation is immunity, it necessitates that various views can interact with and confront one another in the society" (Khatami, 1376 SH, p. 152). Perhaps it is for adducing fact that Khatami tries to consider religion as consistent with the principle of freedom. He repeats such a message and analysis in United Nations Organization as well. "From this base and from the pulpit of the United Nations, I say that despite the hardships and plights, the man's movement is towards freedom and liberty, and this is God's immutable tradition. And certainly, the malevolence and wrongdoings of some of God's servants cannot deviate His ordinance and the history's path" (Khatami, 1379 SH, p. 60). Even such a movement towards freedom was the path of history and will finally manifest in the idea of Mahdawiyyat. "The man's history is the history of freedom and just perceiving history as the field of manifestation of freedom can open the past to us and give us the opportunity to enjoy it... and this can be considered another statement of the well-known idea of Mahdawiyyat" (Khatami, 1379 SH, p. 61). Here is the point where Khatami links freedom with human dignity. "It is with such an understanding and interpretation of freedom that one can defend human dignity and virtue against both the political dominance of the states and the rush of poisonous winds of disappointment and bewilderment, and consider the movement of the history towards freedom" (Khatami, 1379 SH, p. 61). Therefore, the way Khatami adduces Islamic laws is different from the way the fundamentalists adduce them. More than propounding freedom in the framework of a priori principles, Khatami mainly tries to adduce the public acceptance to explain such restrictions so that
they may lead to formation of a society wherein the individuals' freedom is provided on the basis of abnegation, abstinence and reinforcing the moral characters. "On the onset of the revolution, we were not to prevent whatever we would not like. Elsewhere, I have said that what happened in the early years of revolution was done with consciousness, precision and under the complete supervision of Imam Khomeini. The revolution's honor is that it took the first step with freedom, and this was not a random affair not in the hands of the government agents. In principle, we were to give opportunity to others to have their voice, and the limit of freedom of thought and speech was conspiracy" (Khatami, 1376 SH, p. 153).

Thus, the content of freedom in Khatami's discussion constitutes freedom of thought and security for expressing it as well as the political freedom in society. In this way, he tries to clarify the concept and limit of conspiracy. In his view, in the Islamic system, it is necessary to demarcate freedom and conspiracy according to rational rule. Besides, in such an atmosphere, we must attempt for discovering and presenting superior thought, stronger logic and a more appropriate and more attractive solution for the issues of the society. "The Muslim youth in an Islamic regime must believe and feel that Islam gives him a personality and gives his life an orientation, in return for the limitation created for him, in whose light he feels pride, richness, grandeur and tranquility; and one must be persuaded both intellectually and emotionally so that he feels content" (Khatami, 1376 SH, p. 156).

Thought and opinion are not created by someone's order to disappear with someone's order. "Any person must be free to say his opinion. However, there is a difference between the method and opinion endorsed by people's vote that have found legal, conventional and moral legitimacy and the opinion that has not been subject to voting or has not be endorsed by people's vote" (Khatami, 1386A, p. 120). In his view, the most persistent and lasting regime is the one that creates
the least restrictions for expressing one's thoughts. This is because "one of the most important pillars of reformation is freedom of criticism and thinking" (Khatami, 1386A, p. 121).

Besides, another requirement for freedom is the freedom of the opponents. "Freedom of opponents means that the opponents of the state must be able to say their opinions. I have frequently stressed on this principle. I maintain that this principle is an Islamic one and that people accept it. Of course, all of these must be within the framework of law, the law that people have voted to and has been set as the basis of order" (Khatami, 1386A). Therefore, Khatami maintains that the freedom of the opponents makes sense in the framework of the law. That is, not anyone's opinion can become the basis for action, even if people oppose it. The opponent can speak, but the basis for action is what is agreed upon by majority of people and acknowledged formally.

The general result of Khatami's discussion on freedom as the citizenship right is the priority of freedom. As we said before, freedom is in the framework of the constitutional law, which is itself subordinate to people's freedom; and thus, the constitutional law leads to the reproduction of the initial freedom. In Khatami's discussion, Islamic rules also serve as a framework for freedom: "The law that people have voted to and has been set as the basis of order...exiting the law means exiting the order and leading the society towards a bad situation that no one accepts. The law is quite clear. Its frameworks are clear, and the positions of Islam and people are quite known there" (Khatami, 1386A, p. 121). Viewed from this angle, firstly, Khatami defends the political dimension of religion, especially the doctrine of jurist's authority, in the framework of constitutional law, which is itself legitimized by people, and secondly, it is a serious necessity to make religion in line with freedom, and history makes sense with freedom. Thus, a priori restrictions in his discussion on freedom all are subject to human will and case law, losing its decisive position and credit.
On the contrary, the fundamentalists explicitly stress on the priority of celestial laws over the man's freedom. In his discussions, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi has considered freedom from this perspective. From that perspective, freedom is already restricted to certain limits, and the man cannot breach them. As a result, this religious legislative will causes freedom to be restricted. This is because the constitutional law and the foundation of the political life take their credit and legitimacy from divine permission, which is confirmed by the authoritative jurist (wali faqiḥ) in the Occultation Period.

Viewed from this perspective, freedom is never absolute, and a Muslim, when he accepted God's servitude, cannot be [absolutely] free. "It is not accepted to claim that we have accepted Islam, but that we have freed ourselves from servitude to God. This is because not only this absolute freedom is rejected from the religious viewpoint, but also it is not accepted by reason. Islam and religion in general heralds freedom, but freedom from worshipping and obeying tyrants and anyone other than God, not freedom from obeying God" (Mesbah Yazdi, 1378 SH, vol.1, p. 85). Even in the Holy Quran, those verses whose themes are non-dominance of the Prophet over people "are addressed to infidels before converting to Islam, meaning that the Prophet cannot force them to convert to Islam and has no dominance over them" (Mesbah Yazdi, 1378 SH, vol.1, p. 70). Indeed, according to those verses, freedom and volition in accepting divine commands are before converting to Islam. But after that, any Muslim must accept the authority and dominance of the Prophet and the Islamic rulers and observe the Islamic values. "Although the Islamic state does not interfere in people's private lives and issues pertaining to hidden part of their lives, it makes all liable to observing divine limits in relation to social life and in interaction with others, and it severely struggles withbreaching the divine laws and values, sacrilege, and committing sins and evil deeds publicly" (Mesbah Yazdi, 1378 SH, vol.1). In other words,
he distinguishes genetic freedom from legislative freedom. What the Quran and traditions have said about the man's freedom returns to the genetic position. "Although the man has been created free and with freewill, he is legislatively and legally obliged to obey God. That is, he must obey God with his own free will" (Mesbah Yazdi, 1378 SH, vol.1, p. 85).

For him, the habit of escaping obligation was not specified to the ignorance period. Today's modern man does also evade accepting his obligations by claiming to be truth-oriented. This "results from the man's being non-educated and his animal and bestial character as well as following evil, which has always been present throughout history, and is not specified to the modern man. Indeed, this is the modern man that has given up the causes of civility and has turned to the ignorance age and is indeed reactionary (Mesbah Yazdi, 1378 SH, vol.1, p. 72).

Besides, contrary to Sayyid Muhammad Khatami's attitude that introduces freedom as the criterion for human's dignity, Ayatollah Mesbah does not accept such reasoning for freedom. "The saying that human's dignity is freedom and anything that restricts that freedom is rejected is a deceiving motto in the west and accepted in other countries by some who have accepted and insisted on it without paying attention to its consequences" (Mesbah Yazdi, 1378 SH, vol.1, p. 72).

He has also stressed on the necessity of restricting freedom from the practical viewpoint and respecting the sacred things in the society. In any society, there are a series of sacred things respected by the people in that society and – consequently – individuals cannot question those sacred things and values with the excuse of having freedom. Thus, "if somewhere, on the basis of the people's specific culture, something is sacred and respectable, one must not transgress it or disrespect it; and no one can say anything he or she may want in any place. Rather, the person must speak in a way that does not disrespect the sacred things in that society" (Mesbah, 1378 SH, vol.1, p. 92).
difference between Islamic attitude towards freedom and liberalist attitude towards freedom is that liberalism stresses on the minimal nature of the law. But from the Islamic viewpoint, "all our motions and behaviors, both in individual life and in social life and even in our international relations, have order ad regulations; and Islam has laws and regulations for all aspects of human life, including legal and social rules" (Mesbah, 1378 SH, vol.1, p. 136).

In analyzing the reason for the opponents' anger with his statements, he maintains that, "those who seek to deceive people by diffusing eclecticism and mixing up discussions are outraged by my statements, because they are worried that their true intentions and plots are revealed. Of course, there are some others who do not like such statements due to political purposes" (Mesbah, 1378 SH, vol.1, p. 165). This fact returns somehow to spreading intra-discourse otherness in Iran and criticism of the claims posed by the opponents who would introduce freedom as its basic ideas. The movement defending the individual freedom, in Ayatollah Mesbah's view, is defined as follows:

Today, in the mass media and discourses, it is emphasized that individual freedoms are so respected that no one can limit them and no one has the right to hinder them. That is, protecting individual freedoms is something beyond laws, and if there is a law that disrupts individual freedoms, it is void and invalid. Indeed, this mentality is a product of the western culture that we do not like and avoid it; and the authorities have frequently warned us to be careful about infiltration of that culture into our society (Mesbah, 1378 SH, vol.1, p. 170).

In the discussion on discourses of political Islam, other rights and duties have also been studied. However, it seems that the most important axis of difference among them has been determining the concept, limits and status of freedom and its relationship to Islam.
4. The depth of citizenship

From the perspective of the depth of citizenship, we may find many similarities in the views of the discourses of political Islam in Iran. In the fundamentalists' attitude, the individual participates in the political arena according to his religious obligation. Thus, he must be faithful to the collective causes of the political life. In such an attitude, although freedom has its specific limits, and the citizens interfere in the political life in the framework of religious values beyond human centrality, he participates in the political life as a religious duty by his voluntary presence and accepting the religious authority of the rulers. Such a feature is found in the deep citizenship.

The view of the reformist discourse is also consistent with the model of deep citizenship. Unlike the liberal attitudes wherein the citizenship remains on the surface and individualism hinders considering the aspects of the collective life, in the reformist discourse – while having more affiliation with the western modernism – the western attitude in this regard has been criticized. Sayyid Muhammad Khatami maintains that one of the basic weaknesses of the western civilization is that it has ignored the foundation of commitment and faithfulness and the role of piety in the western liberalism. In Khatami's view, the modern west started its civilization by cutting from the revelation and rational thinking and turning to the empirical sciences, which has resulted in the dominance of sensationalism. The storm of various crises covered great progresses to finally reach the territory of empirical sciences and face the modern materialist civilization and "shook the palace of the new man's illusion of getting the spell and the password of the safe life" (Khatami, 1373 SH, p. 288).

Now after four centuries of emergence of the western civilization:

"we can see the signs of fatigue, old age, and the inner weakness in the current civilization and can claim that the mankind, wishing a new order and a new world, is standing at the threshold of
entering a new age on a high platform of experience and awareness” (Khatami, 1373 SH, p. 289).

One of the reasons for this crisis is the one-dimensional freedom in the west. "The man has had valuable achievements in the sphere of legitimate freedom, but the one-dimensional freedom, originated from the uni-areal soul of the man in the new age of the west, has become the origin of many heavy hardships in human life" (Khatami, 1373 SH, p. 289). Such a freedom has also victimized the social justice. The modern west has been harmed from another aspect too. The western man, by casting doubt in reason and piety and replacing them with technical progress, "caused the certainty and assuredness as the pillars of the man's felicity to lose their foundation and caused the man to be subject to a tight tragic life along with bewilderment" (Khatami, 1373 SH, p. 290).

5. Type of citizenship

The typology of citizenship in the viewpoints of the discourses of the political Islam can be considered as the active dutiful citizenship. As we saw in the discussion on political participation, they stress on the active participation of the citizens in the political arena. Such a citizen is accompanied, in addition to the citizens' will, by religious obligations, prepares – as the result – a model of active dutiful citizenship. Despite sharing this model, however, we may consider the difference between them as well. Their distinction can be found in the confrontation of the top/down political participation. In the attitude of the fundamentalist discourse, such participation is prescribed downward, while in the reformist discourse, it is prescribed upward.

6. The scope of citizenship

The scope of citizenship is posed in the discourses of the political Islam from two different aspects. The first is the limitation of
citizenship to the national borders. The second, however, is the extension of the citizenship rights to non-Muslims. This has highlighted the dispute of first and second-class citizens between the representatives of the discourses of political Islam in Iran. Of course, it seems that in the first aspect, compared to the second aspect, there is more agreement between the two discourses. From the theoretical and religious viewpoints, citizenship in Islamic nation is assessed on the basis of religion, and any Muslim enjoys citizenship rights by confessing the unity of God and the Messenger's mission, and his life and properties will be protected in the Islamic state.

However, in the political systems of the modern world, among which is the IRI as a nation-state, the national borders and the constitutional laws of the countries have created privileges among Muslims. Thus, the scope of citizenship is automatically reduced to national borders. This fact is quite settled if, in the theoretical dimension, the validity of the political life is confirmed by the votes of the people inhabiting a certain geographical region or the very nation-state, and the citizens will be defined on the basis of their national identity, not on the basis of religious identity. In that case, the theoretical position will be quite in line with the practical position.

In the discourses of the political Islam, in common, the practical reality of the national borders is accepted by admitting the validity of the constitutional law. In the constitutional law, the conditions for citizenship of the Islamic Republic are accepted; thus, accepting it in general would mean accepting those restrictions as well. One of them is linking citizenship in IRI to enjoyment of the right to previous nationality or acquiring it. However, we may find a difference among the discourses of political Islam in theory.

In the reformist discourse, the theoretical and practical positions conform. This is because the foundation of legitimacy of the Islamic regime is considered to be the people's will and preference. The
inescapable result of this will be, in theory, the theoretical restriction of citizens to the limits of national borders. As said before, Sayyid Muhammad Khatami maintains that the legitimacy of the Islamic regime is founded on people's will and preference. He believes that in Iran, the positions of the supreme leader and the state are defined in the constitutional law, and each move in their legal position according to the rules and regulations stated in the law (See Khatami, 1379 SH, p. 238).

On the other side, Ayatollah Mesbah has stressed on the priority of the Authoritative Jurist (wali faqih) over the constitutional law. On an occasion, he has said that the legitimacy of constitutional law is not due to people's affirmation; rather, it is because the Authoritative Jurist, as a person permitted by the Sacred Law and the Infallible Imam, has confirmed it (Mesbah, 1378 SH, vol.1, p. 104). In this interpretation, although the acceptance of the constitutional laws is accompanied by the widespread limitations of the citizenship, it is still – in theory – the validation of the scope of citizenship by religious doctrines that prepares the ground for expansion of the citizenship scope.

Another disputable issue among the discourses of the political Islam in Iran regarding the scope of citizenship is the first-class and second-class citizenship. Propounding the doctrine of civil society and promoting the political-social freedoms on the part of reformists discourse caused reactions by the fundamentalist discourse in that era. One of those reactions was the insider-outsider idea that proclaims equality among all members of the society – including those faithful to the regime and those unfaithful to it – in enjoying political-social rights. This was a part of the objection posed by the reformist discourse to the arbitrary supervision of the Guardian Council. Although such an objection was originated from the parties' disagreements in later 1360s, the project of political-civil freedoms proposed by the reformist discourses aggravated it.

Ayatollah Mesbah seems to be among the first persons who put
forward the first and second-class citizenship. In his sermon in Friday Prayer of Tehran, he shifted his discussion from a merely scientific issue to the sphere of political struggles and caused the reformist discourse to react to his speeches. He explicitly said that according to our Islamic foundations, we have two types of citizenship: first and second-class citizenship.

In the initial and ideal Islamic scheme, one of the conditions for citizenship is Islam, and the Muslims are considered as first-class citizens and the non-Muslims are considered as second-class citizens. However, under certain conditions, the geographical borders are considered valid and – according to the law – certain conditions are defined for citizenship. And according to the theory of Authoritative Jurist, when those conditions and their legal foundations are confirmed by the Authoritative Jurist, they will be necessary to be obeyed just as other Islamic laws (Mesbah, 1378 SH, vol.1, p. 55).

In his view, the essence of humanity is equal in all human beings and we have no first and second-class human. "However, this does not mean that all men are equal in everything, even in citizenship of a country and using the privileges of the rights of a citizen. All over the world, it is generally accepted as an international principle that citizenship and nationality have special conditions, rights and privileges (Mesbah, 1378 SH, vol.1, p. 55).

Accordingly, this has been mentioned in the Iranian constitutional law as well. Thus, "it is sophistry to say since all human being are common in humanity, we do not have first and second-class subjects! Of course, we do not have first and second-class human beings, but we have first ad second-class citizens; and this is what Islam has also accepted" (Mesbah, 1378 SH, vol.1, p. 55). Finally, he is quite surprised that his opponents pay little attention to the project of first and second-class citizenship as mentioned in the constitutional law. The result of his discussion is reinforcement of the foundation of arbitrary supervision
and explanation of the reason for limitation imposed on some citizens for occupying some official positions. Thus, while the people of a country are considered its citizens, they are not equal in enjoying all offices and posts, and their rights are different. However, the question on what criteria specify their rights is variously answered. We believe that all these must return to the divine permission (Mesbah, 1378 SH, vol.1, p. 55).

On the contrary, the reformist discourse objected to the division of citizens to first and second-class and regarded it as opposing the constitutional law. In Sayyid Muhammad Khatami's speeches, this principle has been emphasized as well. "In our age, these nice melodious speeches can be heard everywhere, which are the foundation of the man's life. The men have rights and honor, they are equal, they enjoy the right to govern their destiny, power arises from the man, power is controlled by the man himself" (Khatami, 1379 SH, p. 82). According to such a basis, he opposes the idea of first and second-class citizens. "If we want to enter the third millennium – wherein the man, his honor, his rights, peace, justice and tranquility govern – we must change this view. We must appreciate the fact that we have no first and second-class human. The man is the man in everywhere and must be respected" (Khatami, 1379 SH, p. 83).

Anyway, it seems that the difference in the citizens' rights is a basic reality in the IRI constitutional law. Specifying certain qualifications and conditions for occupying political offices is found in all societies, and it is found in the IRI constitutional law. However, although expressions such as the first and second-class citizens creates a particular figure for the Islamic regime from the outside perspective, such a discussion is practically accepted in Islam, and the people of the scripture (i.e. the followers of other religions) – despite enjoying the basic rights as citizens – do not enjoy some of the privileges. They have rather less duties before the Islamic society.
7. The end of citizenship

The end of citizenship in the discourses of the political Islam is commonly emphasis on the man's achieving dignity and felicity. Unlike the modern theories that consider the end of the politics to be achieving freedom, in the discourses of the political Islam in Iran, achieving dignity and felicity is stressed on. Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi has stressed on such an end:

"From the divine point of view, there is an end for the man's social life and that is for the man to grow and come closer to his human goals in the light of the social life…. If we accept that the end of creation of the man is achieving the perfection in the light of proximity to God, the social life is a means for reaching that goal faster and better. Thus, preparing the ground for security and welfare and fulfilling the material needs are preliminary stages for achieving that ultimate goal, i.e. the man's perfection and proximity to God Almighty" (Mesbah, 1378 SH, vol.1, p. 264).

Sayyid Muhammad Khatami also has stressed on the preparing the ground for realization of society's felicity in religious state. Thus, the end of the religious government is the felicitous society: "The highest and the most prominent guidance is from the Holy Quran. Indeed, the Quran teaches us how to live. The Quran is the book of life. It is true that the man is not a preexistent being and is emergent, but he is eternal. That is, although his existence is realized in a certain moment in time, this existence continues forever" (Khatami, 1386B, p. 73).

Of course, he notes that in the Quranic guidance, the man is the axis. Guidance means leading and admonishing the man, but he himself must attempt and cover this path:

"In the divine insight of the Quran, the man is God's vicegerent on the earth and he is the cream of creation with all its grandeur. This universe has been created for the man and is a roadster for the ambitious flights of the man who is affiliated with God and
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celestial world. And this is why he is God's vicegerent on the earth, who has made the earth and the sky under the man's control, and the man is the axis of this universe and naturally of the society. The Islamic society is a human-oriented community, because the man as God's vicegerent must make the life on this earth and in the society and nature. The more he has the divine attributes, the more he will be God's vicegerent and His representative. And as I said before, God is the absolute wisdom, knowledge, beauty, power and creativity. The more these attributes become in individuals and in the society, the more the proximity to God will be, more divine the society will be, and stronger the man's vicegerency will be" (Khatami, 1386B, pp. 80-81).

Altogether, in a comparative attitude, we may show the citizenship model in the viewpoints of the representatives of discourses of political Islam in the following table:

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Conclusion

Investigating the evolutions in the Islamist discourse in Iran shows that considerable evolutions have taken place in articulation of the discourses of political Islam during the 1360s SH. These evolutions can be perceived as position of discourses in facing the dominant discourse in the global arena as well as intra-discourse positioning. The challenges originated from the other dominant discourses in the global arena have caused otherness to be reinforced among the discourses of the political Islam. This procedure has mainly started since 1375 SH by centrality of leaning towards public legitimacy, freedom, civil society, and political development on the one hand, and leaning towards Islamic values, divine legitimacy, jurist's authority and negation of liberalism on the other hand. Similarly, in the sphere of political identity and citizenship, these evolutions can be observed in leaning towards citizenship model with individuals' active role in the legitimacy of the Islamic regime in the reformist discourse, as well as leaning of the fundamentalist discourse towards dutiful active citizenship with the acceptance of the authority of the rulers appointed by God. According to the comparative study, we may say that when each of these discourses dominate some parts of the political power, and when there is a variety of interpretations and readings of value,
norm and culture, the lines of rupture are formed in the society. At the present time, opposing discourses among the elites and government agents have led to the distribution of opposing values. Reposing in the meeting point of opposing values forms the contexts of identity crises. The foundation of various readings creating numerous theoretical disorders in perceiving phenomena, ideals and values of the Iranian society under the IRI returns to the aforementioned discourses. In the present time, those discourses have formed the arena of worldviews. In the first decade of the emergence of those discourses, due to various reasons including the powerful charismatic character of Imam Khomeini, the increasing legitimacy of the political system and priority of transnational responsibilities showed itself in the form of showmanship. Then, the new generation of intellectual elites who were subject to globalization posed numerous questions that went beyond showmanship and led to challenges in the levels of identity and civilization.
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