

Research Article

The State in the Political Thinking of Mullā Ṣadrā and Imam Khomeini¹

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Abstract

The main question of the present article is as follows: "what are the features of the state from the viewpoint of a group of Muslim thinkers known in the framework of transcendental philosophy?" The claim of this article is that the specific aspect of the state from the viewpoint of a group of the philosophers of the transcendental philosophy lies in the type of viewing the rational necessity of the state, in explaining the relationship between religion and state and between religion and politics, and specially, in the people's role and status in the state. Thus, the present article attempts to use the approach of political philosophy and a descriptive-analytical method to deal with some of the features of the state. In this article, the abovementioned claim is investigated by considering the opinions of the philosophers of the transcendental philosophy, including Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī and Imam Khomeini as well as some other thinkers of this philosophical school. The consequences of the discussion are reflected especially in delineating the rational necessity and evidences

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of the presence of state, the scope of the state's interference in the society, explanation of the features of undesirable state, the people's role and presence in determining their destiny and backing up the state, and the type of their view of the relationship between the religion and the politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Keywords

transcendental philosophy, religion, state, political philosophy, transcendental political philosophy, Mullā Ṣadrā, Imam Khomeini.

Introduction

The discussion on the state is among the most important discussions propounded in the political sciences, especially the discussions pertaining to the political thinking and political philosophy. This importance is because of the fact that the state's decisions and measures vividly affect all the pillars of the society, especially the people's lifestyle. This has caused various thinkers to regard the issue of a great importance to be discussed. However, it has been less scrutinized in the discussions of our philosophical schools, especially in the contemporary period. Thus, it is necessary to reread the Islamic philosophical schools in this regard, and discuss the features of the state in those intellectual systems on the basis of today's needs. The present article generally claims that the state in any of the systems of the Islamic philosophy has special features. This article is also committed to reread this issue in the system of the transcendental philosophy. While those features can be discussed very broadly, they are restricted to the view of the rational necessity of the state, the explanation of the relationship between religion and state and between religion and politics, the people's role and status in the state, and considering the dimensions of the undesirable state in that system. Naturally, this article cannot deal with all aspects of the issue and will deal with some parts of it. Accordingly, we have attempted to insert in this article some of the aspects of the most important discussions regarding the state in the opinions of transcendental philosophers not referred to in other articles of the author. It is worth mentioning that the author has published an independent article on the approach of the transcendental political

philosophy to state (Lakzaei, 1398 SH). Therefore, here he does not present some of the discussions to prevent repetition. Besides, the author has appropriated one chapter of his newly published book entitled *Hikmat Siyāsī Muta‘āliya* (Lakzaei, 1399 SH) to the state, and the present article is based on that book. The following section deals with this subject in four lines of discussion:

1. On the rational necessity of the state

The discussions propounded on the state by the thinkers of the transcendental philosophy are somewhat variant, ranging from the necessity of the state and the way it is formed to the scope and latitude of the statesmen. Regarding the necessity of the existence of the state, there is almost no disagreement among the thinkers of transcendental philosophy, and almost all of them emphasize its necessity. For example, Imam Khomeini, as the philosopher of the transcendental philosophy, has emphasized this necessity in his book entitled *Kashf al-Asrār* as a sociopolitical text written in his youth, enumerating it as rational precept (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 181). From the same perspective, he refers to the state's discretion in the public sphere and asserts that the states, anyway, have the right to discretion, making decisions about the people's lives and properties, sometimes out of desperation. Therefore, in Imam Khomeini's view, it is better for the ruler to be someone who is permitted to act on his discretion in the public sphere. Indeed, in his view, the qualified individuals are those who are allowed to act on their own discretion in the abovementioned matters. Imam Khomeini continues to prove the jurist's right to discretion (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 181). In other words, he maintains that if a person is qualified, he can decide on people's lives and properties. It must be noted that Imam Khomeini, elsewhere, regards the private sphere out of the scope of such discretion. Indeed, the person qualified for managing the state cannot interfere in or influence people's private sphere (See Lakzaei, 1396 SH). However, the details of the issue must be discussed.

In the discussion on divine state and the fact that the [true] ruling belongs only to God, Imam Khomeini initially puts forward discussions and, after

reviewing the human states, he proves the right to state for the qualified jurist (*faqīh*). The very important point he proposes in criticizing the human states is that in those states, and even in the human laws, what is the criterion is the personal interests. Exactly from this viewpoint, the discussion on the interference in personal life and private sphere begins. Thus, in his view, the ruler who enacts laws must be someone who is able to consider the interests of all people.

It may be said that what he has referred to here is somehow similar to the discussion of "the original position" and "the veil of ignorance" put forward by the contemporary political philosopher John Rawls in his discussion on justice. By the original position, he means the assumed and ideal position during which the principles of justice are chosen. That position must be able to resolve the problems through agreement and secure that a fair agreement is formed. Rawls assumes that the imaginary parties to a contract are profiteers and are just committed to maximizing their abilities for pursuing their goals. However, it assumes that they act rationally and are able to perceive the relationship between the means and the goal, know what conditions make achieving their goals possible and what conditions hinder achieving them. In effect, it is for the opposing interests of the rational and profiteering individuals that justice must reconcile them fairly. To make this possible, Rawls puts forward the idea of "veil of ignorance". Veil of ignorance means that "nobody knows his position in the society, and his social class and status; and that he does not know his share of natural blessings and capacities, intelligence, power and other things. The two parties of the contract do not even know what the concept of good is, and what their psychological desire is" (Lessnoff, 1999, p. 370). In Imam Khomeini's view, what is prominently considered in the common states in human societies is considering the personal interests. Thus, the one who becomes responsible for the state, especially in legislation, must not consider his own personal interests. According to the same reasoning, Imam Khomeini maintains that state does initially belong to God and the prophets and that nobody is allowed, because of what was mentioned above, to establish state

and legislation system. Besides, he puts forward the idea of humans' deficiency in having a good command of all aspects of life and their possibility in making mistakes. Therefore, the ruler must be someone who completely dominates all aspects of the society with no error.

In addition, another condition is added to the necessary conditions for establishing the Islamic state, and that is the state's independence of foreign states and its being free from yielding to them. Indeed, the state that takes over the people's affairs from the Islamic viewpoint must not be subordinated to foreigners. This condition is, of course, a critique to the 1st Pahlavi, which was seriously propounded in the period when Imam Khomeini's *Kashf al-Asrār* was written (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 182). Besides, Imam Khomeini has criticized *passim* in that book the state of the 1st Pahlavi, and this was one reason why that book was not allowed to be published later on. For Imam Khomeini, thus, not being subordinated to foreign states is also a qualification for the state; but the point that there may be, among the human states, a state free from errors needs contemplation. The result of such a view may be said to be resistance and freedom. In fact, the Islamic state cannot rely on foreign powers for realizing the Islamic values, or make use of any means to further the society's affairs. Consequently, what is of importance is how to obtain necessary tools for achieving that result. Therefore, in this view, the goal does not justify the means; rather, the means – as Imam Mūsā Ṣadr indicates – is itself a part of the goal; and one cannot achieve an honorable goal by using dishonorable means (Ṣadr, 1396 SH, vol. 12, p. 55).

The important point in Imam Khomeini's speeches is the justification of legislation that must be performed by qualified person or persons, and not all people can do legislation. Imam Khomeini's reasoning is that God has created the universe and the human on the basis of "wisdom" and that He knows all human's faculties and features; thus, enacting just laws and governing is up to God Himself or His representative. Therefore, the comprehensiveness of the divine laws as well as the political and judicial laws is emphasized. For Imam Khomeini, establishing the state – under the Prophet and the Imams – is up to them according to the divine ordinance

(Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 184). However, in answering the question of "who is qualified to manage the public affairs in the Occultation Period?" he comments that establishing the state is up to the jurist (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 185). Of course, this does not mean that all *mujtahids* (expert in legal reasoning) can enforce authority and form state; rather, Imam Khomeini himself refers to and discusses the jurists' disagreements on issues such as "having or lacking authority" and "limits of authority and the scope of state".

After all, Imam Khomeini questions the legitimacy of the despotic state and considers it oppressive. In this regard, he asserts that "we consider the dictator state as oppressive and their agents as oppressors" (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 239). For him, as emphasized elsewhere, the state that does its duties and there is no oppression in it is supported: "if the state is dutiful and its organs are formed according to the Islamic state, the personnel are dutiful with no robbery or bootlegging, and they behave according to the Islamic law, neither the state is oppressive nor have the personnel assisted the oppressors" (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 239).

Therefore, the very important criterion suggested by Imam Khomeini can be considered as a basis, and that is 'oppression'. In that case, if the state organs block the way of oppressing and the state as well as its agents and personnel do not oppress people, then – according to Imam Khomeini – one can say that the state is somewhat legitimate. Such a view makes Imam Khomeini close to Ayatollah Nāʾīnī and his theory of *qadr-i maqdūr* (the possible measure) as well as the discussion of reducing oppression in the Constitutional State. Indeed, since Ayatollah Nāʾīnī confirms Constitutionalism with such a view, one can say that Imam Khomeini's view in *Kahsf al-Asrār* has come close to acceptance of the Constitutional State. This is because according to Nāʾīnī's argument, there is less oppression in such a state, and the state and its agents do their duties; so, presence in the state's organs is not naturally helping the oppression. Thus, such statements can be regarded as confirmation of the state originated from the Constitutionalist Movement. Of course, there are also other discussions in Imam Khomeini's *Kashf al-Asrār* that can be regarded as opinions approaching him to Ayatollah Nāʾīnī's view

and acceptance of Constitutional state.

The above discussion can be continued, because we know that Imam Khomeini's disagreement with sultanate and royal system is definite, and the evidences for this are traceable in his works from *Kashf al-Asrār* to his later works. As to the acceptance of Constitutionalism, it is worth mentioning that although it is in line with reduction of oppression, it can be included in the thinking system of Imam Khomeini, for this political structure is anyway defined under the royal system, which is definitely rejected by Imam. Thus, it seems that in spite of the initial evidences for the closeness of Imam Khomeini's view and that of Ayatollah Na'inī, one may not find strong evidences – on the basis of Imam Khomeini's views explicitly stated in his *Kashf al-Asrār* – for his acceptance of Constitutional state.

Anyway, what is important is that according to Imam Khomeini's view, not only the state is necessary but also the agents and persons who are seeking to enforce divine laws, do not pursue their own interests, are not subordinate to foreign powers, and do not yield to foreigners. Accordingly, one can say that most thinkers of the transcendental philosophy agree with him. Besides, in his book entitled *Wilāyat al-Faqīh*, he mentions the reasons for the necessity of a religious state in detail. Thus, his demands are fulfilled to the extent that the state does its duty in giving service to people. However, this does not mean the legitimacy of sultanate system in Imam Khomeini's thought. Nevertheless, a state would be legitimate and acceptable to the extent it grants services to the people.

2. The relationships between the religion and the state

In Mullā Ṣadrā's view, politics is the regulation of the minor affairs. Thus, politics is the most available aspect of the worldly life. Indeed, one may say that in Mullā Ṣadrā's view, politics is the regulation of the life. Therefore, in his view, politics and state are present before *Sharī'a*. In other words, when the state's policies regulates the minor affairs of the public sphere and organizes the material aspect of the people's life, *Sharī'a* comes in. This can be regarded as meaning that the presence of *Sharī'a* in the society depends

on conditions that the state's policies must prepare. Another theme is present in the religious doctrines from the same viewpoint in which poverty has been regarded equal to infidelity; or it is said that a hungry person lacks faith. There may be some individuals who have leanings towards religion due to its transcendental point which is promotion of justice and struggling with oppression. This is a sign that some preliminary measures must be taken for the presence of religion in the public sphere, and there is no possibility for the social presence of religion until those conditions are realized. It may seem that such a view of the relationship between religion and state – considering the conditions of the emergence of religion under the Prophet – is not right; and that before establishing a state, the Prophet was seeking to explain and promote religion. But one can well say that the success of religion was secured and fixed when the Prophet could establish a state and thereby created the supportive tools for himself. As one can find out by investigating the history of religions, the religions have not been able to obtain social credit unless they had obtained the support of the states. However, this must not be interpreted as meaning that the religions may be promoted and even imposed through stateal tools; rather, it means that the state can use its own tools to enforce the religious ordinances, especially that Islam is basically a social religion and requires a social and political headquarter for its realization.

Accordingly, we must change our interpretation of the meaning of religion. In that case, religion would mean the law and show the human's path in life. That we take religion and *Sharī'a* as the law is documented in the works written by the philosophers of the transcendental philosophy as well. Thus, religion provides 'law' for a reasonable life in society. Mullā Ṣadrā, therefore, considers religion as the resolution of disputes and hostilities in society, which is – of course – based on the religious doctrines offered by the Legislator and the Prophet. Thus, the society wherein religion and *Sharī'a* are present shows that the level of politicizing of the society members is in such a level that the presence of *Sharī'a* is felt. In other words, a consistent community has been formed which requires certain policies.

As the thinkers of the transcendental philosophy have stressed, policy is the regulation and organization of the society. *Sharīʿa*, however, takes over the responsibility of directing human's life and stating the goals of the transcendental living in addition to resolving the disputes and hostilities, and attempts to promote human's life and make him closer to felicity. Felicity in the sense stated in transcendental philosophy considers both the worldly dimensions and the spiritual dimensions simultaneously, trying to say that felicity is attained through efforts and volitional substantial motion. The important point is that, according to Mullā Ṣadrā's view, felicity must be attained in this world and the path to constructing one's tomorrow and the hereafter life passes through this world. In 'Allāma Jawādī Āmulī's words, the Paradise is constructed in this world (Jawādī Āmulī, 1387 SH, p. 111).

In Mullā Ṣadrā's view, it seems as if the worldly part of felicity must be completed by politics, and the general role of politics in any society is to enrich people in their worldly dimension. Nevertheless, as Mullā Ṣadrā explicitly says, *Sharīʿa* comes in afterwards and begins directing one's life in the direction of otherworldly felicity. This is while, as we mentioned before, one of the principal and fundamental functions of religion is resolving disputes and removing hostilities whose worldly dimensions and consequences are clearly known. However, if we consider this latter part of religion's interference in politics – i.e. resolving disputes and removing hostilities – *Sharīʿa* strongly interferes in the state and does not come at the end of politics; rather, it comes amid the politicizing and political measures, helping in modifying policies and continuing policy-making.

Considering what is discussed regarding the 'time' in the transcendental philosophy, we can find out that it is the human's mind that creates policy. Indeed, the mind devises a plan – by delineating the past events and its ideals and aspirations – in the light of which the policy is created. In this sense, policy is a collection of tactics and means that organize the human society and direct humans towards their destiny. Thus, Mullā Ṣadrā maintains in his *al-Shawāhid ar-Rubūbiyya* that the body is a roadster which must take the soul to its destiny (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1385 SH, p. 494). Therefore, it has the role of a

device that must be considered. Besides, the nature and the world are as a vessel wherein an individual must make his hereafter in his lifetime through providence.

Perhaps one can say that politics pertains to thought and opinion. Thus, it must be subject to *Sharīʿa*. Indeed, *Sharīʿa* determines the action plan for politics, and politics enforces that plan. In a sense, one can say – according to Mullā Ṣadrā – that the politics is the vehicle of *Sharīʿa*, just as it is asserted in the transcendental philosophy that the body is the vehicle of the soul. In this way, there is a strong relationship between them, and their separation can have harmful consequences for the society.

Apart from what Mullā Ṣadrā has stated on the relationship between *Sharīʿa* and politics in his *al-Shawāhid ar-Rubūbiyya* in detail and in his *al-Mazāhir al-Ilāhiyya* in short (see Lakzaei, 1391 SH), this discussion is referred to in the relationship between the body and the soul. Imam Khomeini is among the philosophers who have made use of this relationship for their view of religion and politics as well as the clergy and the state. He has put forward this discussion in his *Kashf al-Asrār*. There, he has used the example of the head and the body as well as the eye and the foot. For example, in one occasion, he has said on the separation between the clergy and the state: "the separation between the clergy and the state is like the separation of the head from the body. The state loses, with that separation, the independence and the domestic and foreign security, and the clergy's position is weakened" (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 208). Indeed, the religion and the clergy as the head and the state as the body interact and further the society's affairs while completing one another. Imam Khomeini's description of the relationship between the clergy and the state is a vivid one, because he uses the metaphor of head and body whose separation is impossible without dying. This is while Mullā Ṣadrā uses the metaphor of the slave and the master in his discussion of the relationship between *Sharīʿa* and politics. Here, the religion is the master and the politics is the slave who must always obey the religion. Although Mullā Ṣadrā refers to four distinctions between *Sharīʿa* and politics, it seems that Imam Khomeini's metaphor for the clergy-state

relationship speaks somehow of the complexity of the religion-politics relationship which is not – like the master-slave relationship – a one-way relationship. In that metaphor, the eye and the foot each has its own specific function. Consequently, the foot walks and the eye sees. The head also plays its role as the commander who manages the body, and the body serves as a tool for the head. This is while in the master-slave relationship, the master commands and the slave obeys, and there seems to be no mutual relationship. Indeed, one can easily imagine the separation between the master and the slave. Besides, the slave can disobey his master's commands, while the head and body or the eye and foot are not so, and one cannot imagine a mutual relationship between them.

Therefore, it seems that Imam Khomeini's discussion in explaining the religion-state arrangements is of greater importance and considers a more and broader presence for people. Besides, Imam Khomeini's explanation of the *Sharī'a*-politics relationship using the head, body, eye and foot seems to lack the value element, and each occupies its own place, playing its role naturally and really. Indeed, each of the aforementioned elements has a function that must be considered in its own place. One cannot imagine a [living] body without a head. Thus, one must not say that the end of politics is the beginning of *Sharī'a*, because *Sharī'a* is present along with politics, dealing with resolution of disputes and removal of hostilities.

Besides, the interaction of these elements and gathering of the forces can have more effects, each of which is worth noting. Thus, Imam Khomeini, in a critique to Pahlavi state's performance which he mentions as one of the mistakes of that state, says Pahlavi tries to hinder the clerics' influence among the people and make them pessimistic about the clerics. This, for Imam Khomeini, means separation between the spiritual forces (religion/clergy) and the material forces (state/ politics) (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 190). Therefore, he attempts to repair the situation and reestablish the relationship between spirit and matter or religion and state so that the society can be directed towards the desirable situation. Elsewhere, however, Imam Khomeini uses the metaphor of the head and body in explaining the

relationship between the executive power and the legislative power or legislature. From this viewpoint, the legislative branch of the state is more important than its executive branch. Indeed, the executive branch must follow and enforce the laws enacted in the legislature. From this viewpoint, the politics and *Sharīʿa* are together, and the image of "end of politics is the start of *Sharīʿa*" will be out of mind. This discussion is noteworthy especially in view of the fact that Imam Khomeini lays stress on the qualification of the legislators. In general, the simile and metaphor of the eye and leg, spirit and body, or head and body are used in Imam Khomeini's works for the relationship between religion and state as well as clerics and politics. Meanwhile, he uses this example for the legislative and executive branches of state to emphasize that these two branches much go hand in hand; otherwise, one cannot expect the society to go further and arrive at its destiny (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 213). Here, by legislative power, Imam Khomeini means playing the spiritual and strategic role and by the executive power, he means playing the operational, executive and material role (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 213).

The very important point is the following question: "How is the religion and what we expect from it delineated in this view?" The answer is that this view has explicitly stated its expectation from religion. Therefore, this view leads to creation of a social status for religion and does not reduce it to individual restricted views. It is from this viewpoint that Imam Khomeini maintains that: "religion has come to organize state, country and life" (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 236). He continues by asking the following question: "Which religious law opposes the country and the life?"

In this regard, however, Imam Mūsā Ṣadr has presnetd discussions in more detail. He expects religion to help the society's solidarity and coordination. Indeed, if religion cannot afford to bring about social coordination, it will seem to have no right function in the society and must be behaved in another way (See Ṣadr, 1397 SH). In this way, a direct social expectation is put on the religion's shoulder and it must have a serious and effective presence in the society and be able to affect people's condition of

life and their way of living. Accordingly, in addition to resolving disputes and hostilities, creating solidarity is among the religion's functions. This task – which Imam Mūsā Ṣadr expects religion to perform in the society – is expected by Mullā Ṣadrā to be done by "affection".

In his treatise entitled *al-Maẓāhir al-Ilāhiyya*, Mullā Ṣadrā mentions the distinctions between *Sharīʿa*, prophethood and politics. What he refers to here is much more concise than what he has dealt with in his book entitled *al-Shawāhid ar-Rubūbiyya fil-Manāhij al-Sulūkiyya*. Indeed, one of the reasons for summarizing the discussion in *al-Maẓāhir al-Ilāhiyya* is the aforementioned point: here, Mullā Ṣadrā is not seeking to discuss about *Sharīʿa* and politics; rather, he has attempted – in proportion to discussion on obliging the follower to worshipping and obedience – to state the justificatory reasons of this view. Accordingly, unlike *al-Shawāhid ar-Rubūbiyya fil-Manāhij al-Sulūkiyya*, here he only mentions two distinctions between *Sharīʿa*, politics and prophethood, i.e. the distinction in view of activity and passivity; and he does not refer to the two distinctions in the origin and destiny explicitly stated in *al-Shawāhid ar-Rubūbiyya*. In stating the relationship between the prophethood and *Sharīʿa*, Mullā Ṣadrā writes: "the relationship between the prophethood and *Sharīʿa* is like the relationship between the soul and the body wherein the soul resides" (Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī, 13264 SH, p. 114). However, as I have mentioned elsewhere, Mullā Ṣadrā's words are unfinished here, because he speaks of three circles of prophethood, *Sharīʿa* and politics. In this regard, as I have mentioned in my book entitled *Falsafayi Siyāsī-i Ṣadr al-Mutʿallihīn* (= Mullā Ṣadrā's political philosophy), Mullā Hādī Sabziwārī's annotations have added a fourth circle to those three circles, and that is the state. Indeed, one must speak of the relationship between four items: prophethood, *Sharīʿa*, politics and state. Just as the prophethood is the soul of *Sharīʿa*, one can say the state is the soul of the politics. In general, however, *Sharīʿa* is considered the soul of the politics as well; and in Mullā Ṣadrā's view, one cannot imagine a politics without *Sharīʿa*. Nevertheless, in spite of the analysis I have presented in *Falsafayi Siyāsī-i Ṣadr al-Mutʿallihīn*, the discussion seems to be incomplete.

In addition, Mullā Ṣadrā has explicitly stated – both in *al-Shawāhid ar-Rubūbiyya* and in *al-Mazāhir al-Ilāhiyya* that he has quoted this from Plato. Anyway, there is a view that Mullā Ṣadrā sees the prophethood and *Sharīʿa* in one line, which forms the soul of the politics as a result.

Mullā Ṣadrā explains that some philosophers have maintained that there is no difference between *Sharīʿa* and politics, while he quotes Plato – in *The Laws* – that they are false, and there are distinctions between *Sharīʿa* and politics from two viewpoints of activity and passivity:

Difference in activity mode: the difference between *Sharīʿa* and politics in activity mode is that the actions of politics are partial and incomplete and gain perfection and survival through *Sharīʿa*; however, the actions of *Sharīʿa* are general and complete with no need to politics (Ṣadrud-dīn Shīrāzī, 1364 SH, p. 114).

Difference in passivity mode: the difference between *Sharīʿa* and politics in passivity mode is that *Sharīʿa* is necessary for and inseparable from the pious person but politics is separate from the politician's essence. For instance, *Sharīʿa* orders the person to say prayers and fast. If the person accepts and acts accordingly, the benefits come directly to him. The politics, however, orders the person to appear in dressy and luxurious clothes; and it is clearly for attracting the visitors not for the person wearing them (Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī, 1364 SH, p. 114).

The contents cited from *al-Mazāhir al-Ilāhiyya* treatise are not different from those cited from what he has stated in *al-Shawāhid ar-Rubūbiyya*, except that he has mentioned four differences between *Sharīʿa* and politics in *al-Shawāhid ar-Rubūbiyya*, and referred to the difference between the origin and destiny, which seem to be even more important. However, he has paid attention to the difference between these two from the viewpoint of activity mode, and we can say that he has spoken of the dependence of politics on *Sharīʿa*. There, he has discussed the two differences between the origin and destiny in more detail and here, he has dealt with the distinction between the activity and the passivity modes in short. Of course, it is noteworthy that he does not consider those two equal and does not regard them distinct. Indeed,

some may speak of the sameness of the politics and *Sharīʿa*, but Mullā Ṣadrā does not believe so.

Anyway, politics – in Mullā Ṣadrā's words – deals with minor affairs. This notion of politics is mentioned by Mullā Ṣadrā in stating the distinctions of *Sharīʿa* and politics; and it seems here is the only place wherein Mullā Ṣadrā defines politics. For him, therefore, politics means dealing with the minor affairs of the social human life, and – in one sense – it means organizing the human society. Thus, one can say the most important function of the state is organizing the public affairs of the society. Therefore, politics must deal with the details of human life and provide the basic necessities of the society. Accordingly, Mullā Ṣadrā considers *Sharīʿa* after the politics and maintains that *Sharīʿa* arrives after the politics, and it is when the politics has managed to fulfill an important part of the human's basic needs. Then, *Sharīʿa* comes after it and takes measures wherein the human's spiritual promotion is manifested. Thus, the state is expected to organize all human's material and necessary affairs. Then, it comes to *Sharīʿa*'s turn. This is, of course, analyzable on the basis of Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical discussions. When he speaks of the soul's physical origination and spiritual survival, his idea is somehow manifested in politics as well. Thus, first the politics is formed and deals with the organizing public life, and then the stage of human's spiritual promotion starts with *Sharīʿa*.

One. The negative aspects of state

The negative aspects of state has been importantly explored and criticized by the thinkers of the transcendental philosophy. Among them is Mullā Ṣadrā who speaks – in the first *Mazhar* from the second part of *al-Mazāhir al-Ilāhiya* treatise, in his discussion on the soul and modifying it with witnessing – of a very important point that can show hypocrisy in ruling and social life are severely renounced and undesirable. Under the discussion on reincarnation, he mentions a hadith from the Prophet regarding some people who "are apparently brothers and inwardly hostile; their tongues are sweeter than honey and their hearts are more bitter than gentian root. Their hearts are

like the wolves' hearts [in atrocity], and they wear lambskin for people (They are the wolves in sheep's clothing)" (Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī, 1364 SH, p. 69). In this saying, indeed, Mullā Ṣadrā, while rejecting reincarnation, maintains that in some cases, "it is the metamorphosis of the inwards that someone's heart is the wolf's heart and his face is the human's face" (Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī, 1364 SH, p. 69). Therefore, the worst thing one can imagine in a state is that people think the statesmen are supporting their lives, properties and honor, while those statesmen think differently. Thus, from this viewpoint, honesty is an important page in the Islamic state and is the criterion for the moral health of the Islamic state and society.

One may say that, from another perspective, such discussions can be considered as a discussion in the political morality, but such a vicious political morality is a sign of a society nurtured in this way and its people cannot express their real emotions due to various reasons including the emergence of despotism, absolutist state, and fear of telling one's ideas. Consequently, some form of duality is seen in the individuals' language, behavior and performance in private and public circles. Therefore, Mullā Ṣadrā – in line with a group of people of intuition and adherents of various religions and denominations – speak of the true reincarnation. Indeed, when the society behaves dually, it has been involved in true metamorphosis: "the true reincarnation for the people of intuition and the adherents of religions and denominations is the metamorphosis of the inward and change in the outward from one's face to a face with which the inward is – because of the dominion of sensual faculties – suitable or proper, to the extent that the temperament and form of both is changed into a form appropriate for that animal trait" (Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī, 1364 SH, p. 69). Thus, the existence of such a society cannot be desirable, and naturally the state must counter such phenomena, preparing favorable social conditions. Of course, as mentioned before, it is sometimes possible that the state itself has caused such a situation due to deviations; thus, the state must undergo reformation. Honesty in the society goes back to the same issue; the more honesty is there

in a society, the more it is far from reincarnation, and the more honesty is hidden in a society, the more reincarnation occurs. Imam Mūsā Ṣadr considers honesty as the 'source of goodness' (Ṣadr, 1396 SH, vol. 2, p. 449) and stresses on honesty in the society and among people and the rulers. Indeed, what validates the trust between people and state is 'honesty'. Apart from the abovementioned view, Imam Khomeini mentions another aspect of the state in the Occultation Period and sets a criterion for the state, and that is 'oppression'. Indeed, if the state acts according to the vicious political morality, it is undesirable and makes itself illegitimate. Similarly, if it acts upon oppression, it is illegitimate again. According to Imam Khomeini's view, what causes the state to exit from the state of oppression is 'non-oppression'. In his words, the sense and reason dictate if the state acts upon its duty, it is non-oppressive; but if it does not do its duty, it is oppressive. From this perspective, the legitimate state is the state that performs its own duty. Therefore, in the Occultation Period, the states must act upon their essential duties for people and society not to be considered oppressive (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 221). By putting forward this criterion, he concludes that the common states of the world have not been formed on the basis of justice and, accordingly, one can consider them as oppressive (Imam Khomeini, n.d., pp. 221-222). He compares this with "Hitlerian Creed" (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 222) who did not believe in any limits, did not observe justice, and transgress others' rights. Therefore, in addition to honesty and sincerity, justice can be considered as a moral criterion for desirability and undesirability of the Islamic state and society. In one sense, if justice dominates, honesty would be also running in the society, and the statesmen would also enjoy it.

With the descriptions and positions stated for the scholars by Mullā Ṣadrā, Imam Khomeini enters the social and more objective issues. In *Kashf al-Asrār*, Imam Khomeini explicitly puts forward discussions that refer to the social and political role of the jurist in the Occultation Period. In one occasion, he emphasizes the jurist's supervision and writes: "as we stated

before, we do not say that the state must be under the jurist; rather, we say that the state must be managed with the divine law which is the good of people and country; and this is not done without the spiritual supervision, just as the Constitutional state has also enacted and affirmed this" (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 222). This leads, on the one hand, to the closeness of the people and the state, on the other hand, causes the independence and grandeur of the country to increase (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 222). Therefore, he asserts the negation of the absolute state and absolute state (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 227). Here, 'absolute' refers to the politically absolute.

Two. The people's importance, status and role

One of the very important discussions in the contemporary era pertains to the people's role and status in the state. As to the people's role and effect, some may think that the transcendental philosophy does not deal with people's role and status. Although such a proposition is merely a claim with no reasoning supporting it, the authoritative view existing in this philosophy is adduced as the evidence for this discussion. This is while according to the discussions of the transcendental philosophy, the human is not considered a fixed and static being with no motion and no ability to establish his own way of life. As mentioned before, the man intended in the transcendental philosophy is in the state of continuous and perpetual 'becoming' which enjoys dynamism and renewal. If such an interpretation of human being is accepted, one can say he has a role and effect in the individual and social spheres, without reducing the role and power of the state. In fact, the state's power arises from the human's power and inquiry manifested and erupted. In addition, the discussion on the physical origination of human's soul has also established such a view and emphasizes that human's motion is in a clear track which strongly distinguishes him from other animals.

Anyway, one can speak of the people's role and their high status in the society. In fact, all the mechanisms shaped in the state must be done through the people's presence and participation. The power of the statesmen is also

based on the people's support and presence. This point has been considered both in Mullā Ṣadrā's discussions and, in the contemporary era, in Imam Khomeini's opinions and that of other adherents of transcendental philosophy. If Mullā Ṣadrā speaks of the ineffectiveness of the social aspects of the highly-qualified leader in the absence of people (See Ṣadrud-dīn Shīrāzī, 1371 SH), Imam Khomeini also – following him – regards people's vote as the criterion (Imam Khomeini, 1387 SH, vol. 8, p. 173), and Ayatollah Jawādī Āmulī speaks of the necessity of the ruler's consultation with the elites and experts about the management of the country's affairs (Jawādī Āmulī, 1379 SH) and, somehow, ties the legitimacy of the ruler to those specialized consultations which leads – to a large extent – to the expansion of people's role and the elites' influence; and Master Muṭahharī asserts the people's role in choosing the president by the people and transitory nature of leadership period with Islamic content (Muṭahharī, 1374 SH, p. 80) in which case, the people's role, presence and participation seems to be considered very bold. In addition, in Ayatollah Jawādī's view, people are considered the pillars of the tent of politics (Jawādī Āmulī, 1393 SH), and those pillars are not to be slant or frail.

Anyway, if we consider the authoritarian view expressed in some of the opinions, this authoritarianism does not mean, according to the viewpoint of the adherents of transcendental philosophy, no need to people and their absence in the social and political scenes; rather, it must be said that the social, political, cultural and economic scenes become meaningful with people's effective presence, and without them, it is impossible in view of the discussions and principles of the transcendental philosophy. This, however, has not been ignored by Mullā Ṣadrā, because Imam's power and the power of the political agent are granted to them by people, although the conditions of Imam and the ruler have been emphasized and confirmed by the religious authorities. Accordingly, obliging people to accept the state and its decision is not legitimate, and the state will be legitimate when the people accept it. With such a look, there emerges a large space for all people's activities in the public sphere and they make the state's plans realize in the public sphere, which are in effect their own request and demand, helping the public

movement in accordance with their own goals. If there is no such presence and movement, we will observe the gap between the people and the state. If we speak on the basis of Mullā Ṣadrā's view, there emerges a distance between the body and the soul of the society and the state's plans – which may be to the benefit of people and enacted for their welfare and peace – would not go forward.

In this situation, what can help such a society is the spread of a view which maintains that the people's confidence has been hurt and must be remedied in a right way. Respect and confidence are most important, which has not been ignored by some contemporary Muslim thinkers in the desirable rule. Imam Mūsā Ṣadr mentions confidence and respect among the desirable conditions of a dialogue and, accordingly, a desirable society. If such a condition governs the society, people would be aware of their role and the society's affairs would go in a right direction. Thus, one must say, with no exaggeration, that the state – whether based on the religious teachings or not – is basically meaningless without people. Accordingly, preserving and continuing it would be meaningless without people's support and presence. Thus, the people's role and presence is taken very serious and important in transcendental philosophy. It can be said that the more people's presence is serious and effective, the stronger the pillars of state will be. Therefore, any distance created between people and state will cause people to get away from the state. In that case, the trust, confidence and honesty between people and state would be in the lowest level.

Imam Khomeini's wording in the ten-year period of his leadership is full of admonition and warning about that position and presence. Of course, Ayatollah Jawādī Āmulī has referred to it with another wording. For him, people are the pillars of the tent of politics and political system, and any action that helps the wavering of the pillars is in effect considered as leading to breakup of the society. He refers, in stressing on such a view, to some hadiths of Imams and strengthens his words with the religious teachings. Before him, Mullā Ṣadrā confirms this view in another way, and brings forth the discussion of legitimacy to show his perception of people's role. He

refers to the metaphor of 'physician' – also mentioned in the viewpoint of other Muslim thinkers – to state that a society may have skillful physician or physicians, but people may be deprived of his expertise and knowledge (See Şadrud-dīn Shīrāzī, 1371 SH). Therefore, a society may have righteous individuals deserving rulership, but people may have no leaning towards him and the society may deprive itself from the services of those individuals. However, it is emphasized that people must freely choose and participate in the public sphere. Nevertheless, if a qualified individual is accepted by people, again their role and effectiveness is not ended, and they must have always a more effective presence in supervision. Indeed, neither do people stop their reasoning nor they stop the supervisory tools. Rather, they are obliged to keep on their continuous presence and supervision in the public sphere.

Anyway, according to the soul's physical origination, we must say that the society without the desirable conditions would have the same policy. In that case, we cannot expect a virtuous policy from a society without virtues. This viewpoint has been more explicitly stated in Ayatollah Jawādī Āmulī's expressions, because he believes that "the transcendental politics is specified to really humane societies" (Jawādī Āmulī, 1387 SH, p. 90), just as the moral and spiritual politics also arise from the moral and spiritual society. Therefore, we may say that the people's role in transcendental philosophy is bold and effective. Naturally, we cannot direct the society towards virtues and make a virtuous society by force. The society itself must demand virtues and move towards them freely, just as Iranian society did in its public movement in 1979 Revolution as well as the eight-year war imposed by Iraq, playing an important role in those spheres with the people's voluntary presence.

We may say one of the reasons why Mullā Şadrā left the society was that the society was not able to accompany his intellectual and cultural new-thinking. Therefore, considering the pressures on him, he went on to an involuntary migration and exile in order to create new spaces. This is while Imam Khomeini – with people's widespread and voluntary accompaniment as well as their revolutionary confrontation – caused the fall of Pahlavi's political system after fifteen years of exile and being away from his

homeland. In fact, the important point in Imam Khomeini's success and Mullā Ṣadrā's failure, and even the failure of other transcendental philosophers – considering the conditions of the time – must be considered in view of people's presence and accompaniment or lack of their accompaniment. Therefore, although Mullā Ṣadrā in some of his works such as *Risāla Si Aṣl*, *Kasr Aṣnām al-Jāhiliyya*, introduction to *Asfār Arbaʿa*, *Īqāz al-Nāʾimīn*, etc. has complained of the conditions of the time and criticizes in the existing conditions, but since those complaints are not completed by the waves of people's accompaniment and presence, his thought remains hidden and finds no strength for causing movements.

It is also noteworthy that according to Imam Khomeini's view, the state cannot function without people's accompaniment: "the state cannot defend its country with people's lacerated hearts" (Imam Khomeini, n.d., p. 189). Accordingly, indeed, people's presence and participation and their playing role in the state can mean that their role in state is much important and prominent. In fact, some affairs are not possible without people's presence and accompaniment. One of them is 'defending their homeland'; and if people do not accompany, the state cannot resist. As we recall, in the past eras and even in the contemporary period when the Allied Forces entered Iran, the state could not take any measure with the large number of its military forces, unlike the eight-year period of Sacred Defense against Saddam Hussein's regime when the Iranian state could protect well its borders and did not allow enemy to seize any part of its lands.

In addition, as mentioned before, Ayatollah Jawādī Āmulī has considered the presence of people in the state and their role in the public sphere and in the state as the pillar of the regime and emphasized that role. This emphasis is much important and shows the people's weight and credit in establishing the state in transcendental philosophers' view, just as Mullā Ṣadrā has referred to the simile of the physician and people's not referring to him, regarding the people's non-presence as leading to no realization of medicine. But if the people are present in the scene and participate, medicine is realized and the physician can do his duty according to what he has learned.

Conclusion

In the present article, we discussed some of the features of the state from the viewpoint of some transcendental philosophers and considered discussions such as the rational necessity of state, the relationship between religion/*Sharīʿa* and state/ politics, speaking of some features of the undesirable state as well as the people's status and role. In this article, indeed, we explored the state according to Mullā Ṣadrā's view in the initial pages of his *Aṣfār Arbaʿa* wherein he regards 'philosophy' as organizing the subsistence system and rescuing the resurrection, and that issue was seriously investigated from the perspective of the state and its role in society and its construction. The most important axes discussed include: the rational necessity of the state, the relationship between the religion and the state, the undesirable state and the people's status and role. The last section, however, was discussed in detail from the viewpoint of transcendental philosophers and we referred to the ideas of some of those philosophers who believed that people are the pillars of the tent of politics and the state, and any inattention to that role and effect causes a gap between the state and the people. In the same section, we presented some important discussions on the basis of Mullā Ṣadrā's view in suggesting three types of policies (i.e. just, authoritative, and torturing) which are called three figures of the state; then, we discussed Mullā Ṣadrā's view and that of the political transcendental philosophy of the state and its effect and interference of its various figures in the public sphere. Accordingly, it was explicitly mentioned that on the basis of three types of the state or the politics delineated by Mullā Ṣadrā, the state's most important role is delineation of just policy, exerting punitive policy and, most importantly, the authoritative policy in the sense of care and supervision in enforcing [the laws] and managing [the society]. From this perspective, it seems that the state must not have an interfering role in various sections of the society; rather, the main task of the state is supervision and care in enforcing and managing policies and decisions, and the people's ability and capacities are used in managing the society. In that case, we would observe the most popular state whose role and interference in the sphere of the public

affairs is the minimum one and it merely deals with the supervision and care as well as the fundamental policy-making and preparing the ground for desirable living with peace and welfare. In addition, this article has another turning point and that is discussion on the relationships between religion and state, which is offered using Imam Khomeini's discussions in *Kashf al-Asrār* treatise. Considering the aforementioned discussions, we can say that Imam Khomeini's discussions are in line with the discussions on the relationship between *Sharī'a* and politics offered by Mullā Ṣadrā in his *al-Shawāhid ar-Rubūbiyya fīl-Minhāj al-Sulūkiyya* and *al-Maẓāhir al-Ilāhiyya*, wherein he has more precisely distinguished politics from *Sharī'a*.

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