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## Research Article

### Analysis of Civilization and Formation of "Order" in the Islamic World<sup>1</sup>

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#### Abstract

In the science of international politics, subjects such as "the nature of international system", "anarchy", "order" and "change" are considered as the content concepts. Each of the theories of international relations explains the concepts and, accordingly, presents its formation of the milieu of international system and its subdivisions. The present study is placed under the great question of what explanation the level of civilizational analysis in international politics presents for "order" in international system. It specifically deals with the following question: "If we evaluate the 'order' in the realm of a region – such as west Asia or a wider area such as the Islamic world – using the level of civilizational analysis, what formation of 'order' will it offer?" It seems that the hypothesis of 'level of civilizational analysis' in the international politics in dividing the regions of the world presents a new plan and transmits it beyond the dualism of global analysis/ regional analysis. Thus, it explains the campaigns inside the international system on the basis of presenting a new formation of 'order', the rules for its formation and the sources effective in its formation. The

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level of civilizational analysis analyzes the order in the Islamic world by considering different forms of Islamic civilizations (or civilization trends) inside the Islamic world, and explains the behavioral campaigns (convergent/ divergent) on the basis of hierachal division of civilization inside the Islamic world.

### **keywords**

international politics, level of analysis, civilization, order, Islamic world.

### **Introduction**

Civilization thinking has grown considerably in the last three decades. Some part of this growth is influenced by the theory of the "Civilization Clash" and the rival theories, and some part influenced by the practice and people's leaning towards the concept of "civilization" in countries such as Iran, Turkey, Malaysia, China, and the like. In spite of many detailed writings and establishment of numerous institutions for studying civilizations in Iran, paying attention to civilization in international politics has been marginalized despite the attention of western scientific centers to it and the scientific development of the academic discipline of international relations influenced by the concept of civilization. Recognizing the scientific evolutions in the global sphere and giving priority to amending the existing scientific gaps in that sphere is the most important factor that makes research in this sphere necessary. The emergence of the level of civilizational analysis in international relations has been accompanied by entrance of new concepts such as civilizational identity, civilizational state, civilizational order, and the like. Applying these concepts in civilization analyses has been vividly clarified and, after three decades of scrutiny on the part of experts of international relations, we can clearly speak of the level of civilizational analysis in international relations, and apply it for understanding and explaining or predicting the future condition of the world and spheres such as Islamic world.

The Islamic world has seen upheavals in the two last centuries. Insecurity, disorder, and continuous crisis are the main symptoms of upheavals in the Islamic world. The internal crises in the countries, wars among the Islamic

countries, cutting relations or having minimal relations, difficulties in relations with western world, emergence of unbridled crises such as the emergence of Tālibān and ISIS are vivid examples of the upheavals. The complexity of this situation caused the emergence of different theories in analysis of the conditions of the Islamic world, so that one can present – in the light of those theories – a variety of methods for getting out of the existing situation.

One of the new analytical levels in the science of international relations is the level of civilizational analysis. When we use the level of civilizational analysis as the tool for analyzing the international politics, we must investigate what interpretation it would present of the basic concepts of the international politics such as order, anarchy and change; and accordingly, what would be the nature of the international system and the formation of the world order, and what rules are applicable to 'order' in the international system. On the other hand, when civilization is used as the basis for analysis, we must pose the following question: "which disorder and crisis can the level of civilizational analysis – as Spragens (1976) says – find, identify its reasons and offer solutions for?" And finally, if we want to use civilization as a theory, what would be the main questions pertaining to civilization? After that, we may deal with some minor – but more important – questions regarding analyzing the phenomenon of order and change in global subsystems such as the Islamic world. The questions posed are as a major project in stating the relationship between civilization and international politics. The preliminary parts of the present discussion are two topics: "order in the international politics" and "civilizational order in international politics". In the discussion on 'order' in the international politics, the main question is "how the order is formed in the international politics, and whether the order in international politics is country-centered or there are other elements – such as international system, regional system and the like – involved in creating order". To answer these questions, there are different ideas and views, and this is among the issues with no theoretical consensus around it. The lack of consensus in the scientific theoretical debate in the

science of international relations is rooted in elaboration of elements (including material and immaterial) of global community and the extent of their role in influencing the global politics. This is because the main question in the science of international relations, despite all changes realized in it, is how the states act and how other variables affect their behavior (Jackson, 2010, p. 206). Similarly, in the second heading, i.e. the relationship between 'civilization' and 'order' in the international system, there are two approaches. Each approach offers a different reading of civilization, and this causes a difference in the analytical output. The first approach is essentialist and considers civilization as a situation, and the second approach is a processual reading of civilization. The result of the essentialist approach is impossibility of interaction between the civilizations and other agents influenced by civilization as well as an increase in the level of struggle and severe divergence caused by the anarchic situation in the international system; and the result of the second approach is the possibility of interaction among the civilizations considering the real space among them and the existence of the capacity of convergence (See Murden, S. 2005, pp. 1026-1027; Hobson, 2007, pp. 16-17).

In the present study, the focus is on the following question: "what formation of order in the Islamic world does the civilizational analysis offer?" to answer this question, various formations of order realized in the Islamic world and ideas presented for going beyond disorder and towards the stable order are revisited and then, based on the principles taken (civilization as a process), the nature of order in the Islamic world is analyzed. Rereading the issue of 'order' in the Islamic world with a civilization-centered approach is done according to parameters such as "perception of the surrounding milieu", "processual comprehension of civilization and civilizational order in the Islamic world", and "models of order and civilizational order in the Islamic world".

### **1. The level of civilizational analysis and perception of surrounding milieu**

In humanities, there is a tight relationship between external realities and

different branches of humanities. Along with discovery of every phenomenon in the social world, there appears an evolution in humanities as well. This is because a part of the science's mission is basically solving the problems and overcoming the crises to reach the desired order and condition (see Spragens, 1976). There is no difference between empirical sciences and humanities in this regard. In the discipline of the international politics as a branch of social sciences, these vicissitudes and evolutions in social world has caused the emergence of various theories and various analytical levels. Two fundamental concepts in studies pertaining to international politics are the concept of 'order' and its perennial companion, 'anarchy'. Anarchy has been described as "the lack of dominating and regulatory faculty" in the international system. The actors' understanding of these two concepts forms their definition of the surrounding milieu, and influences the type of their action. In other words, the presumption in the international politics is that the way one perceives the international system (and its essential elements) influences the resulted knowledge. As a result, the whole science of international relations as the cognition output would be different. From the perspective of the realistic paradigm (Hans Morgenthau's classic realism, Kenneth Waltz's neo-realism, and Gideon Rose's neoclassic realism) the phenomenon of 'order' depends on the number of actors, great powers, and – indeed – on how the abilities and capacities are distributed or the type of the structure is formed. In this approach, the 'order' is more defined on the basis of the practical structure of security in the international system. On the other hand, the liberalism paradigm, the phenomenon of 'order', and the pattern of the interaction of the world after the cold war are dependent on the institutions, regimes, values and norms as well as the mutual dependence; and these factors are considered the main obstacle for war, the creator of order, and modifier of anarchy (Clark, 2005, p. 1417). Non-rationalist theories such as constructivism, criticism, etc. also emphasize the immaterial elements and the mutual strengthening of the elements, combining the elements and, finally, concocting order. Constructivists delineate three spheres of order: the first is "systemic sphere", with Alexander Wendt as the

most prominent figure in this approach. In this sphere, the interactions among state activists are considered and the focus is on the international milieu. The second is the unit level whose main attention is to the factors such as social and legal norms, and the states' identities and interests. Peter J. Katzenstein is the most important theorist of this approach. In that level, the internal factors determining the national policies are considered. The third sphere is holism, which is the reconciliation between the two former spheres. That is, both the domestic affair and the international affair are dealt with as the two figures of one single social and political order. The main concern of the holists is the dynamisms of the global change (Reus, 2013, p. 290). The third level is identical with the level of civilizational analysis and civilizational state.

One of the important questions in this research sphere is how the level of civilizational analysis affects the interpretation of oneself (the actor) and the surrounding milieu (the international system). For instance, if the actor regards itself a nation-state and also regards the main activists in the international politics as nation-states, the actor's interpretation of content concepts such as anarchy order, cooperation, opposition and the like would be different and, as a result, its type of activity would be similar to that of other nation-states. Thus, there is a linear relationship between the type of the actor and the type of behavior. When the actors of the international system are nation-states, the order based on the balance of power and other traditional models would be its output. Cox conducted a process investigation and reach from the type of production to the form of the state, and from the form of the state to the world order. He maintains that it is from the focus on the change in state forms that the changes in production relations and the changes in the structures of world order arise; and in this way, we are led to discovering the relationship between changes in the state forms and changes in the structures of the world order (Cox, 1987, p. 108). This analytical approach deals with the foundations of changes of the state, and is able to reveal some deep layers of analysis and discovery of variables effective on formation of the state and setting its foreign policy.

Understanding the order in the international politics can be considered as dependent on identifying the phenomena effective in creating order and the type of its reading. Identifying and introducing any phenomenon and presenting any interpretation of it will have a direct effect on the type of organizing order in the international politics. This theoretical organization will be effective on determining the inputs of the activists into the milieu of the international system (the formation of the international politics) as well as taking from the outputs of this milieu; and finally, if the feedbacks are positive, it will cause the repetition of behaviors and continuation of foreign policy. Therefore, just as the form of production and development is effective in structure of the state, the civilization as a fundamental variable can affect the structure of a state, interpretation of the surrounding milieu and, finally, the structure of the world order.

## **2. The Processual understanding of civilization and the nature of order in the Islamic world**

The first discussion in understanding the process of civilization is that the processual understanding of civilization – as opposed to understanding civilization as a situation<sup>1</sup> – poses the following question in analyzing 'order' in the international politics and the order in the Islamic world: "Can one predict the future of the world order or the order in a certain region such as the Islamic world or the Middle East by considering the world history or the history of the Islamic world?" In other words, "Can one extract the pattern of ordering from the formation of the past order?" That is, "What image of the nature and condition of order in the Islamic world is presented when we investigate the Islamic world using the civilization approach?" William McGaughey poses these questions on the prediction in the Islamic world and offers the theory that what is obtained from the historical investigation of the orders governing the history of the international relations is the existence of

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1. In that approach, any civilization has a fixed and monolithic essence and, consequently, enjoys parameters and features that are static and immutable (Hobson, 2007, p. 15).

two elements of "relational technology" and "the presence of the dominating institution". The relational technology creates the international and trans-national relations and causes an increase in the level of mutual dependence among the countries, which is among the most important elements of order in the contemporary world (Clark, 2005, pp. 1414-1415). Thus, in order to see a civilizational order, we must reveal two civilizational features completely: first, development of, or better say, overcoming on the basis of relational technology and, second, having access to one (or more) dominant institution (see: McGaughey, 2007) which may occur in the form of a hegemonic state, an empire, on the basis of unity and agreement among nations according to the doctrine of balance of power, or with the birth of 'guarded lands' (*mamālik maḥrūsa*) like those under Ottomans, Safawids, Gürkānīs, or on the basis of the existence of a widespread Islamic civilization like what we observed from the early Islamic era up to the end of the Abbasid period.

Another discussion in this regard pertains to the following questions: "how is 'order' achieved in the international politics? Is 'order' in the international politics a monolithic and complete order or one based on the minor and numerous systems which form a single order together?" If 'order' is based on numerous systems, it is called the international order; if the 'order' is created in a monolithic form, it is called the world order. In Clark's words (2005, p. 1416), in the contemporary age, we must distinguish between two concepts. One is the international order and the other is the world order, because the latter phenomenon has affected the lives and wishes of all human beings. According to each of these concepts, the relationship between the variables (activists such as state, investigating the historical track of order, and its effect on the future order, etc.) and the 'order' is investigated. In this study, our presumption is that we are not faced with the static aspect of the history and cannot reject the possibility of revival of civilization even in the global age. Civilizations are pioneer units and harbingers of the dynamism of history. Thus, one can say that the usage of the concept of civilization – in its singular form (that is one single civilization for the whole biosphere) – was not realized, and non-collapse of other civilizations as well

as revival of civilizations in the global age is a vivid sign of this fact. At the present time, all existing forces in the contemporary world including the India, China, Iran, Malaysia, Turkey, and the like participate in the construction of history, and the theories such as "the end of history" and "clash of civilizations" have lost their originality (Davutoğlu, 2014, p. ix – x). This view of civilization is called post-fundamental approach or processual approach to civilization. Thus, according to our processual approach inside the Islamic world, we will observe the emergence of civilizational sub-discourses (in relationship to the Islamic world), each of which will play a regulatory role in organizing the civilizational order in the Islamic world.

### **3. The models of 'order' in the Islamic world and delineation of the civilizational order**

Entering the discussion of civilizational order in the Islamic world is important because just as the existing order in the Islamic world or in the Middle East is the result of the orientations of the regulatory agents of the foreign policy, the future order of the Islamic world will be also the result of the numerous activities of the existing major regional actors. The reason for the difference in the way 'order' is created in various eras is due to regulating agents, because 'order' is dependent on the way the actors are placed together, and it is the system-making actors that create the order. That is, each era has its own order. The effort to understand the civilizational order in the Islamic world is an effort to understand the existing active foreign policies that lead to 'order'.

Regarding the 'order' in the Islamic world, various models have been mentioned. Two of them are the model of "creating order by the forces and actors of the external or trans-regional milieu" and "creating order through the actors in the domestic milieu". In the former model, order is created by entrance of the great or trans-regional powers or hegemony, which can be divided into hosting and invasion forms. That is, the Islamic countries may, due to weakness, request the presence of external powers in the Islamic world or various regions, like what happened for USA in the Middle East

and the regional powers such as Saudi Arabia are the facilitators and host of that presence. And in the latter case, the presence may be based on the invasion, like the presence of the Portuguese, British and Russian – or even USA – forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the second model, i.e. creating order through the actors regulating the domestic arena, three images can be offered: "the theory of Islamic Vestfalia", "the emergence of nation-states with great power or regional hegemony", and finally, "the emergence of civilizational state". These three approaches have evidences which are discussed in the following sections.

### **The order of the Islamic Vestfalia**

The first approach can be called the Islamic Vestfalia approach. This approach is clearly a modeling from the Vestfalia of 1648 AD. Considering the treaty concluded between the European Catholics and Protestants at the end of the thirty-year religious war (1618-1648 AD) (Kennedy, 1987, p. 74), the Vestfalian reading knows the reason of disorder and anarchy to be the religious disagreements and struggles which has caused very high tensions in various regions of the Islamic world such as Middle East, and believes that by accepting pluralism and moving towards it, the problem of disorder decreases. This is because disorder has its roots in cosmological security and starts from the issues related to identity such as ideological issues and reveals itself in geo-politic, geo-economic and similar issues. The most important effect of Vestfalian hypothesis on the position of religion in the international relations was that it regarded religion as a threat and gave a security dimension to it. That is, according to the Vestfalia hypothesis, like modernization hypothesis, religion was regarded as a final threat for the European order, civilization and security (Thomas, 2005, p. 55). In this approach, secular (political pluralism) is introduced as the best prescription for reduction of the existing tensions in the Islamic world, and it promotes some form of the Islamic secularism, because the logic of power and superiority in the struggle does not lead to the necessary conclusion in the face of ideological forces who fight on the basis of faith. In other words, merely the

confrontation and hindering the phenomenon creating disorder is not enough. Rather, the phenomena such as the jihad movements (al-Qā'ida, ISIS, etc.) must be managed in a way that lose their crisis-creating nature and the possibility of their return becomes minimum. The foreign policy of the countries in the region is, in such a condition, the maximum interaction and the tensions become minimum, because there is no religious state supporting a riotous phenomenon. Vestfalia substituted political realism and the secular model of rational state as the mail model of statesmanship for religion as the basis of foreign policy. The main feature of the Vestfalia treaty was recognized as the norm of non-interference policy in the international relations. Both Augsburg's peace and – a century later – Vestfalia treaty accepted the idea that the ruler must determine the religion of his territory, and considered religious tolerance and non-interference in religious matters in the domestic affairs of other states – or in other words, the very religious plurality among the states – as one of the main models in the modern international order (Naqībzāda, 1384 SH, pp. 10-13). In other words, it was Vestfalia treaty that determined the role and functions of religion in the international relations and domestic policies. In confirming this, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd maintains that what came out of Vestfalia treaty was Laicism, which is beyond secularism. Laicism as the product of Vestfalia introduces itself as the global discourse, which is a solution for religious wars (Shakman Hurd, 2004, p. 77).

### **The order of great Islamic powers**

The second approach to order in the Islamic world or its various regions is through the emergence of the regulating agents with capacity to make order in the level of great or global powers. In that approach, the regional order is made through regional powers which have a quasi-empire nature (See Waltz Kenneth, 2012; Kissinger, 2016). In this theory, the regional order is obtained from the balance of the domestic powers in the region and, with access of various countries of the region to the highest level of military regulating power – such as accessing to nuclear power or very broad military power –

the regional order comes to a stable situation. For instance, with the access of countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the like to nuclear bomb, the regional balance may be created. Proliferation of this model in the whole Islamic world would cause maximum control over the riotous factors, like what has happened between India and Pakistan. On the other hand, these powerful national countries would enjoy high capacity of confronting jihad movements in the Islamic world, and this would cause these groups to transfer out of the Islamic world or become neutral and passive. This is because most jihad groups start insecurity and riot from those countries wherein weak governments rule, with no ability to provide security for themselves and the region. That is, in this situation, negative parameters are in the maximum state. By uniting with regulating states, the weak states would have the ability to establish security in their domestic milieu. The foreign policy of such a state is quite interventional, militaristic, and based on controlling the center of riot. This model can be found in 1320s to 1350s SH in the Middle East and some other regions like North Africa. Muhammad Reza Shah's presence in struggles such as Zufār Battle in Oman and his effort for controlling his surroundings is analyzable in this very model. The proposition of the everlasting state had such a function about the Ottoman Empire that led to underestimation of its main rival, i.e. the West, and consequently non-recognition of the western evolutions and its domestic dynamism. The result of this was the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and its defeat against the West (Davutoğlu, 2014, pp. ix- x). Thus, the order based on the presence of great powers was restricted to the military-security power, and the issues of the cultural and economic spheres were considered as second-hand issues.

### Civilizational order

The third approach for creating order in the Islamic world and various regions is the emergence of "civilizational states". Post-fundamentalist approach and processual approach, unlike the fundamental approach which reduces civilization to the concept of empire, considers a longitudinal

relationship based on the hierachal order between them. That is, it considers civilization as union in relational concept or as the guarded lands in the Islamic vocabulary (Tawakkulî, 1377 SH, pp. 1-3). In this approach, numerous civilizations are beside one another, and the idea of numerous guides is acknowledged in proportion to the number of active civilizations. As Cox acknowledges, we see in line with civilizational ideas the emergence of various civilizational states in a civilizational scope like the Islamic world. In this situation, there is authority, but there is no autism and individualism, so that we will see the existence of a staircase or ladder order. This situation causes the 'sovereignty' to become the special feature of a "non-empire" community, in which case sovereignty goes beyond the realm of the sovereign states (Nexon, 2007, p. 113; Best, 2007, p. 182). As Jacqueline Best says, the pluralistic and universal approaches have mutual effects on one another, and if we are seeking to promote a pluralistic political concept of civilization, we must take serious the relationship between the universal criteria and the special criteria of that civilization (Best, 2007, p. 182).

The civilizational order is neither an anarchic situation nor a hierachal order enjoying a general centricity; rather, the civilizational order is an intermediary order. That is, the civilizations enjoy numerous hierarchies inside themselves. In other words, civilizations are in midway between the anarchic situation and the hierachal situation. As Davutoğlu (2014, p. xi) maintains, "in investigating the world order, we may mention two models of civilizational order: one is the civilizational hegemony and the other is pluralistic civilizational interaction". In the pluralistic model, subjects such as order and anarchy – which are among the most important concepts in the international relations – are analyzed differently. Any civilization, in view of its capabilities in the global civilizational system, has the capacity to act in the milieu resulted from the civilizational order; but these capabilities do not return just to being a civilization; rather, any civilization can play a role in proportion to its civilizational power, and this is true both in the domestic area and in global sphere. In this interpretation, we will have civilizations such as Chinese, Iranian Islamic, Turkish Islamic, Malay Islamic, etc. all of

which – while preserving their identity and enjoying an identity independent from the modern western civilization – will form according to their guiding and central idea, participating in establishing order and modifying anarchy.

In the studies pertaining to international relations, one of the most important goals is reduction of anarchy plagues, for which many solutions are offered. In the situation of civilizational order, the anarchy plagues are reduced and they are somehow modified. One example is the period of struggle between Sekigahara empires up to the reestablishment of Meijin in Japan (Hall and Jackson, 2007, pp. 7-8). Considering the pluralities in civilization as well as an intermediary order (between the anarchic situation and hierachal situation), the borderlines between civilizations are seen inconspicuous. That is, one cannot set a precise and definite borderline between one civilization and another, and there is a blending among civilization in social, economic and cultural aspects. Unlike the essentialists' view, the civilizations are never placed in abandoned islands separated from one another; rather, all civilizations and the related processes are always in interaction with one another (Hall and Jackson, 2007, p. 7). This capacity modifies the lack of dominant powers and the anarchic situation of the international order. Besides, another mechanism that helps the states to manage a modification of anarchy is the fact that civilizational states, unlike great powers that merely emphasize the security or economic control, have the possibility of active presence in cultural, political, social, military dimensions simultaneously (See Nowrūzī Fırūz, 1398 SH), and are able to create a defined jurisdiction and sphere of influence (Collins, 2007, pp. 132-147). This type of order in the periods of Ṣafawīds, Ottomans and Gūrkānīs in the Islamic world, as the observable historical examples and by modifying the deficiencies and adjusting them with the new world, can be used in the contemporary period as well. In this regulating situation, there are both the hardware state and the cultural and software state; and the interaction among the civilizational states begins from the starting point of the cultural elements such as language in a variety of ways (See Nowrūzī and Khātamī-niyā, 1399 SH). For instance, the present government of the Saudi Arabia cannot be a

civilizational state, because its biggest share is in economic-military power which attempts to create the regional order by relying on foreign powers outside the region. The cultural product of the Saudi Arabia in the region and in the Islamic world is too much limited, while this procedure is in inverse position in countries such as Turkey, Iran, Malaysia, etc. (See Al-Aidrus, 2009). Most of those countries claim having a civilizational state. When getting away from the West (other entities) emerges in various levels, we must necessarily look for signs of it in politics which starts from making the state and spreads out to foreign policy. As we previously mentioned in the theoretical discussions, civilizations are initially produced or reproduced by the guiding idea, and then create institutions. These institutions produce products through which the civilizational communication is narrowed or expanded. In the sphere of politics, this idea is referred to as the way of producing and reproducing power. In that process, the civilizational state recognizes the sources of producing its power. These sources are institutionalized and the methods for using them are specified and the goals are determined. Thus, bafflement in orientations and activities decreases. In that situation, the foreign policy of such a country will be in multi-dimensional states. The ability for cultural confrontation along with the ability for economic, military and political confrontations for managing a crisis or a disordering and righteous phenomenon in the Islamic world or the region comes to the maximum condition. And therefore, the civilization state would have the possibility to act in a multiple ways. It is in multiple-action situation that the difference between the civilizational state and the national state is revealed. In the civilizational order, unlike Vestfalian order or the order based on the great powers, the civilizational state enjoys more breadth of variables and indices and the communication channels (communication technology) as well as functional channels. This is because the civilizational state is not merely restricted to its legal function; rather, it enjoys value and cultural functions as well (See Xia, 2013). As for the foreign policy, the situation is such that the civilizational state – in addition to the economic and security presence in the surrounding area – has the agendum of cultural

presence in the realm of trans-border civilizational credit. For the civilizational state, unlike the national state, any trans-border presence for achieving national interests becomes important without considering its preliminaries – i.e. the existence of necessary sources in the realm of the strategic depth, with its achievements more than its costs. Considering the historical experience, in the Islamic world it seems that the civilizational actors are regarded as the favorite model for making order, because the civilizational state is a pluralistic actor; indeed, it is pluralistic inside the country and is moving towards joining to various pluralities in the international sphere; thus, it can properly combine the hard and soft powers and enjoy this privilege (See Katzenstein, 2010). As an example, the civilizational states have several religions, languages, cultures, races, ethnicities and the like inside themselves. As for the language of the civilizational state, for instance, just the juxtaposition of numerous languages is not the matter; rather, the civilizational society can use several languages simultaneously, and enjoy the merits of each at a desired level. Consider Iran under the Ṣafawids, Ottomans, and Gūrkānīs as a very proper example wherein the Farsi, Arabic and Turkish were used simultaneously, and each of them would cover a different thematic sphere (See Nowrūzī and Khātamī-niyā, 1399 SH).

In view of the internal plurality of the civilizations and their being pluralistic, the civilizational states enjoy the sufficient capability for reconstructing their cities as well as the global government. This discussion is proposed because one of the important subjects in the studies on the relationship between civilization and order is the role of multicultural reconstruction of cities and the participatory global state. The basic question in this regard is how civilization participates in the cultural order. Considering the aforementioned discussions, one can state that civilization helps the creation of order by making the cities multicultural and making the global state a participatory one. The multicultural structure of cities is a small sample of the multicultural structure of the world made by civilizations (Davutoğlu, 2014, p. 19). One of the samples that can be used historically and in the contemporary time for explaining this fact is language. The multicultural

cities and civilizational territories in the historical experience of the Islamic civilization can be one of its prominent examples. Thus, the civilizational order in the Islamic world is formed by the civilizational states, which seem to be – in the present time – a better form of order in comparison to the experienced samples, i.e. the national states of the Westphalian type and the great powers, and it seems to have the possibility of reducing the plagues of anarchy and restricting the factors of upheaval.

### **Conclusion**

The entrance of civilization into the international politics is followed by the theoretical and conceptual evolution as well as a change in analysis of the international relations. In the present study, we have focused on the discussion of "order" in the international politics. We reviewed the explanation and analysis of the nature of order in the international politics from the civilizational perspective. The findings of the study are based on the scientific proposition that unlike what Huntington has conceived, the order in the international politics – at least in some of the regions such as the Islamic world – is a civilizational order; and war in the international politics is not a civilizational war. This is because civilizations are pluralistic, and order is created on the basis of regulation, not insecurity and anarchy. The civilizational state enjoys the highest capacity for controlling the negative effects of anarchy. Thus, for the civilizational state, anarchy does not require pursuit of survival and security; rather, it is an opportunity for interaction. Besides, as for the Islamic world, what is acquired on the basis of theoretical discussions and studies is that there is no possibility of creating a monolithic order based on the nation. Even in the universe, there is no possibility of creating a global world, because "order", "peace" and "stability" in the Islamic world will be the product of the presence of Islamic civilizations (affected by the emergence of civilizational states). Any civilizational state will create a specific jurisdiction and prestige for itself and – in better wording – will control its surroundings. And since it is the major actor and the regulator of "civilization" appeared in the form of civilizational state, war

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among such states is not a primary principle. Therefore, considering the fact that civilization is a process and, if formed, the primary situation among the civilizations is not war – or, at least, there is no essential leaning towards war or peace – the best option for resolving the issues in the Islamic world is going beyond the theory of Islamic Vestfalia and moving towards the Islamic civilizations and/ or civilizational states.

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